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ABSTRACT  
For the past few decades, many incidents of sectarian violence have been triggered by 
rumors of interfaith sexual and romantic relationships between Muslims and Coptic 
Christians in Egypt. This thesis argues that the ways in which the Egyptian modern state 
chooses to govern women’s bodies and address the Coptic question has inevitably enabled 
sectarian violence witnessed today to take on its current form. One of the main implications 
of the modernization of the Egyptian legal system was the state’s ability to “jam” women, 
family, sexuality and religion into the private sphere, as opposed to the public sphere.  This 
essentially has created a form of “cross-contamination” in which the religious came to 
appropriate the family, and the family acquired the quality of the religious.  To that end, 
this thesis tells the story of the “affective, visceral, corporeal workings of everyday state 
power” that coheres that cross-contamination between the spheres of the family and 
religion.  Through using the tools offered to it by modernity, the Egyptian modern state has 
been able to maintain a similar religious hierarchy to that which existed in the Ottoman era, 
only this time it has confined this religious hierarchy almost exclusively to the domain of 
the family. One of the main outcomes of such an arrangement is that political conflicts over 
religious difference often end up unfolding over the terrain of familial and sexual 
relationships. By regulating love, the state has concretized the conservatism of both the 
Muslim and Coptic communities and has produced a space for sectarian violence over 
women’s bodies, sexuality and romance. 
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I. Introduction 
This thesis is an attempt to produce a genealogical account of state restrictions placed on 
interfaith romantic and sexual relationships between Muslims and Coptic Christians in 
Egypt today. It is also an effort to investigate the interplay between legal pluralism, 
gender relations, and sectarian identities under the auspices of the modern Egyptian state. 
Building on Michel Foucault’s theory of governmentality,1 I argue that the modern 
Egyptian nation-state became the de facto arbiter in regulating “the private” sphere— 
sexuality, intimacy, and marriage. 
 One of the main implications of the modernization of the Egyptian legal system was the 
state’s ability to “jam” women, family, sexuality and religion into the private sphere, as 
opposed to the public sphere.2 This essentially created a form of “cross-contamination” in 
which the religious came to appropriate the family, and the family acquired the quality of 
the religious.3 To that end, I am telling the story of the “affective, visceral, corporeal 
workings of everyday state power”4 that cohered that cross-contamination between the 
spheres of the family and religion.   
This thesis presents a critique of the codification and secularization of the legal system 
which constitutes the cornerstone of the modern and postcolonial Egyptian state. It is a 
critique of the modernization process in Egypt which helped shape and transform 
religious-based personal status laws into their current form.  I situate sectarian violence 
precisely in this modernization process. More specifically, I explore the relationship 
between interreligious love and marriage, and sectarian violence through the lens of the 
modern state. 
 
1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY )Graham 
Burchell et al eds., University of Chicago Press, 1991) (1991).  
2 SABA MAHMOOD, RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE IN A SECULAR AGE: A MINORITY REPORT, 26, 
(Princeton University Press, 2016), (2016).  
3 Id. 
4Asli Zengin, Violent Intimacies: Tactile State Power, Sex/Gender Transgression, and the Politics of Touch 
in Contemporary Turkey, 12 JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST WOMENS STUDIES, 225, 225–245 (2016). 
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On May 2016, a video of a Muslim mob stripping and parading naked, Soad Thabet, an 
elderly 70-year old Coptic woman on the streets of al-Karam village in Minya province 
circulated social media platforms. The hashtag “Egypt stripped naked” even trended on 
Twitter following the incident.5 Sectarian violence, involving around 300 people, erupted 
in Minya province after a rumor that Mrs. Thabet’s son was involved in a love affair with 
a Muslim woman circulated the small village of al-Karam.6  The police initially arrested 
six men suspected of taking part in the violence7, but in January 2017, the case was 
dropped by Egyptian prosecutors.8 The prosecutors cited the “lack of evidence” as the 
reason behind their decision to drop the case despite the fact that Mrs. Thabet identified 
three of the men she said assaulted her.9 On the other hand, Mrs Thabet’s son, Ashraf 
Abdo Attia, and the woman he allegedly had an affair with were found guilty of adultery 
and were sentenced to serve two years in prison and pay a penalty of 1,000 Egyptian 
pounds.10 In addition, Attia’s entire family was forced to flee the village and could not 
return to their homes because of threats by Muslim extremists in the village.11  
Such an incident should not be treated as an isolated incident. Sectarian violence set off 
by rumors of interfaith sexual and romantic relationships has become a common 
occurrence in Egypt since President Anwar al-Sadat’s era until today. This thesis will is 
an attempt to investigate the reasons behind why this particular form of sectarian violence 
continues to take place until today. Since it’s important to remember to concretize the 
discussion from the abstractions of modernity to the concreteness of lived experiences of 
 
5 Muslim Mob In Egypt Strips 70-Year-Old Christian Woman, THE GUARDIAN, May 26, 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/26/muslim-mob-in-egypt-strips-elderly-christian-woman-
in-violent-attack  
6 Egypt Affair Rumours Spark Inter-Religious Violence, BBC NEWS, May 26, 2016. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36391383  
7 Id.  
8 Raf Sanchez & Magdy Samaan, Egypt Drops Case Against Men Accused Of Beating Christian 
Grandmother – But Prosecutes Her Son For Adultery, THE TELEGRAPH, Jan. 16, 2017. 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/16/egypt-drops-case-against-men-accused-beating-christian-
grandmother/  
9 Id. 
10 Nader Shokri, Son Of «El-Karam Lady» Imprisoned For Two Years For Adultery, WATANI, July 27, 
2017. http://www.wataninet.com/2017/07/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85-
%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%86-
%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%85-
%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86/  
11 Egypt Affair Rumours Spark Inter-Religious Violence, supra note 6.  
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actual human-brings, similar incidents of sectarian violence will be discussed and 
analyzed throughout this thesis.  
The first chapter of this thesis interrogates the modern legal technologies that helped 
preserve the long-standing legal ban on interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman and 
a non-Muslim man. It investigates the late nineteenth century secularization and 
codification processes, which shaped and transformed sectarian identities and patriarchal 
structures into their current status in Egyptian family law. This chapter examines the 
features that underscore the centrality of the modern state, and especially its legal power, 
for secularism in the Egyptian context. 
 A genealogy of the current legal ban on interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman 
and a non-Muslim man reveals a lot about both the dynamics of Coptic-Muslim relations 
in Egypt and the discrimination against women in both communities. Thus, the second 
chapter investigates how the modernization of the Egyptian legal system and the 
introduction of religious-based personal status laws impacted gender relations both in 
Muslim and Coptic communities. In this second chapter, I argue that the modernization 
of the Egyptian legal framework resulted in placing limits on and solidifying the ceiling 
for progressive reforms when it came to questions of women’s rights and gender equality 
both in the Muslim and the Coptic personal status laws.  
The third chapter of this thesis, explores how the modernization of the Egyptian legal 
system and the introduction of religion-based personal status laws impacted both the unit 
of the “family” and sectarian identities. I argue that the modernization process saddled 
personal status laws - and by extension the “family” – with the inordinate weight of being 
the site of the reproduction and preservation of religious identity. One of the main 
consequences of this was enabling any reform attempts aimed at the Coptic personal 
status law to be framed as a violation of the Coptic minority’s collective right to 
“religious freedom”. Unsurprisingly, the right of Copts to “religious freedom” is an 
especially contentious subject given the status of Copts as a minority living in a country 
where the principles of Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation.  
The fourth chapter looks at modern liberal conceptions of citizenship and inspects how 
they are being utilized to conceal religious difference under the pretense of equal 
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citizenship and national unity. These conceptions presuppose the “inclusion” rather than 
“exclusion” of different religious identities in Egypt, which help disguise every-day 
religious discrimination as well as larger structures of oppression directed towards 
Egypt’s Coptic minority. This chapter also examines how different authoritarian regimes, 
starting with Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s regime, were able to manipulate sectarian identities 
and cleavages to score political gains. It argues that these regimes’ chosen approach when 
dealing with incidents of sectarian nature have in fact abetted in generating sectarian 
violence. I examine how the state, in its different authoritarian moments, has used 
informal reconciliation sessions and the State Security Investigation Service to deal with 
cases of sectarian violence pertaining to interfaith love and marriage. Ann Stoler suggests 
that “to study the intimate is not to turn away from structures of dominance, but to 
relocate their conditions of possibility and relations and forces of production.”12 Areas 
such as marriage, sexuality, and reproduction “tend to be critical sites of state regulation 
and the focus of persistent state projects.”13 This chapter looks at how modern secular 
governance has regulated the sphere of the intimate, and in the process, contributed to the 
exacerbation of religious tensions, hardening interfaith boundaries and polarizing 
religious differences.   
The fifth and final chapter of the thesis looks at incidents of sectarian violence that were 
triggered by interreligious relationships and investigates how the Egyptian state chooses 
to deal with those incidents.  It considers whether the perseverance of religious-based 
personal status laws have helped in nurturing this particular form of sectarian violence 
through constraining the conditions of legal divorce for Copts and banning Muslim 
women from marrying non-Muslim men. It also examines existing patriarchal structures 
in Egyptian society and how women bodies have come to represent broader claims about 
their own religious communities.  
Both the Muslim and Coptic communities have shown conservative stances when it came 
to calls for secularizing religious-based personal status laws. Paradoxically, the 
 
12 Ann Laura Stoler, Tense and Tender Ties in HAUNTED BY EMPIRE: GEOGRAPHIES OF 
INTIMACY IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY, 13 (Ann Laura Stoler ed., Duke University Press, 
2006), (2006). 
13 Zengin, Supra note 3, at 225.  
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secularization of most of the Egyptian legal system, except for personal status laws, have 
made those laws the only living witness to the religious character of both communities. 
Accordingly, reforms aimed specifically at this body of law have come to be seen as a 
direct attack on the religious sentiments of both communities. Michel Foucault has 
famously argued that the real danger is not necessarily that individuals are repressed by 
the social order but that they are "carefully fabricated in it.”14 This is particularly true in 
Egypt since sectarian attitudes are reproduced within structures of governance and are 
then reflected and replicated in the fabric of the Egyptian society.  
Notably, my argument here should not be construed as offering an anti-modernist 
critique. Rather this thesis is simply an attempt to investigate the various legal 
technologies, such as the codification and secularization processes, that coincided with 
the modern postcolonial state project. The contradictions inherent within secularism has 
been pointed out by a significant number of scholars and academics. For instance, Peter 
Berger15 and Harvey Cox16, two influential proponents of secularism, have revised their 
positions on the subject. Other scholars such as Rodney Stark and Roger Finke17 have 
also launched a sustained critique against the secularization thesis through their 
deconstruction of antireligious secularization theories. Similar criticisms of conceptual 
and empirical flaws of secularism especially in the context of the Middle East and Egypt 
has also been highlighted by academics such as Talal Asad18, Hussien Agrama19, and 
Saba Mahmood20. 
 
14 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON, 217 (Alan 
Sheridan. Trans., Vintage Books, 1977) (1977).  
15 Peter Berger, The Desecularization of the World A Global Overview in THE DESECULARIZATION OF 
THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS (Peter Berger ed., William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 1999.  
16 Harvey G. Cox, the Myth of the Twentieth Century: The Rise and Fall of Secularization, 27 JAPANESE 
JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES, 6-8, 1-13 (2000).  
17 RODNEY STARK AND ROGER FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH: EXPLAINING THE HUMAN SIDE OF 
RELIGION, 79 (1st ed., University of California Press, 2000), (2000). See also Rodeny Stark, 
Secularization, R.I.P, 60 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION, 270, 249-273, (1999).  
18 TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY 
(Stanford University Press, 2003), (2003). 
19 HUSSEIN AGRAMA, QUESTIONING SECULARISM: ISLAM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE RULE 
OF LAW IN MODERN EGYPT (University of Chicago Press, 2012), (2012). 
20 MAHMOOD, RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE IN A SECULAR AGE, Supra note 2. 
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However, it’s not within the scope of this thesis to pass a value judgment or present a 
critique on secularism as a theoretical abstract concept.  Instead, it only attends to a 
historically specific trajectory of secularism – the one that took place in modern Egypt. It 
examines the historical transformation of the Egyptian personal status laws as they passed 
through the processes of modernization and secularization. It focuses on how these two 
processes, combined with the authoritarian modes of governance helped in consolidating 
the legal ban on interfaith marriages, and in producing a particular form of sectarian 
violence. By regulating love, the state has concretized the conservatism of both religious 
communities and has produced a space for sectarian violence over women’s bodies, 
sexuality and romance.  
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II. Family laws under the Auspices of the Egyptian Modern State 
A. You Can’t Just Marry Anyone: The Legal Framework Governing Marriage 
in Egypt 
The concept of “secular” civil marriage does not exist in many Muslim-majority 
countries. Egypt is no exception. In Egypt, all marriages are conducted by religious 
authorities, and standard marriage procedures are both simultaneously “religious” and 
“civil”. The ma’zoun, for Muslims or the authorized priest, for Christians, performs a 
religious marriage ceremony and also acts as an agent for the state. For the ma’zoun, a 
Christian woman is allowed to marry a Muslim man, however, the opposite is forbidden. 
For the priest, both partners have to be Christians adhering to the same confession 
(denomination).21 A restricted form of civil marriage, in the presence of a public legal 
official, would be permissible in Egypt only in the following exclusive circumstances: 
“1) Both partners are foreigners; 2) A foreigner marrying an Egyptian, however, even in 
this case an Egyptian Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim foreign man; or 3) An 
Egyptian Muslim man marrying a non-Muslim Egyptian woman.”22 
 Only interfaith marriages between a Muslim man and a non-Muslim woman is permitted 
by law; the opposite, a Muslim woman marrying a non-Muslim man, is prohibited. 
However, and in spite of its legality, the Egyptian state still attempts to limit interfaith 
marriages between Muslim men and Christian women; it requests an ‘absence of 
impediment to marriage’ document from the Church as a perquisite for registering a 
marriage between an Egyptian Christian woman and an Egyptian Muslim man.23 Given 
that the Coptic Church repeatedly refuses to issue this document24, this requirement 
successfully installs a bureaucratic obstacle to even this type of legally sanctioned 
interfaith unions.  
 
21 Adel Guindy, Family Status Issues among Egypt's Copts: A Brief Overview, 11 MIDDLE E. REV. INT'L 
AFF, 1-7 (2007). 
22 Id. 
23 United Kingdom: Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note - Egypt: Christians, 42 (June 
2017), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5978ad374.html  (last visited June 8, 2018).  
24 Mariam Ibrahim, A Daughter Marries Outside The Faith: Interreligious Marriages In Egypt Are A 
Constant Negotiation Of Obligations And Identities, MADA MASR, Dec. 8, 2017. 
https://www.madamasr.com/en/2017/12/08/feature/society/a-daughter-marries-outside-the-faith/  
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This legal framework governing marriage falls under the Egyptian civil code and is part 
of the body of law known as the personal status law. In contemporary Egypt as well as in 
many other Muslim-majority countries, the term ‘personal status law’ is understood to 
mean the specific area of law which governs family relations and matters such as 
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. The term ‘personal status law’ is itself 
a modern legal invention.  Historically, Islamic law never had a distinct category of 
family law, or even personal status law.25 In fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), laws 
concerning marriage, divorce and child custody were often scattered under different legal 
categories such as contracts, offences and endowments.26 Today, Islamic law is the law 
that governs the personal status matters of Muslims, whereas officially recognized non-
Muslim communities27 (Christians and Jews denominations) have relative autonomy to 
use their own religious laws to govern personal status matters of their respective 
communities. In other words, legal pluralism in the area of family law continues to exist 
today among the dominant Muslim community and the Christian and Jewish religious 
communities, although it can be argued this legal plurality is in fact asymmetrical. 
B. Not All Laws are Equal: The Hierarchy of Personal Status Laws in Egypt 
 The overarching framework of sharia-based Muslim personal status law is the general 
law, while the other Christian and Jewish personal status laws can be said to be the 
exemptions (lex specialis) to the Islamic law (lex generalis). Islamic law of personal 
status is the formal law that governs the marriage of spouses who adhere to different 
religions or even spouses who adhere to different sects of the same religion 
(denominations). For example, if a Catholic woman marries a Coptic-Orthodox man, 
Islamic Sharia automatically becomes the applicable law if one of the spouses decides to 
file a case in family court. Also, in the case that both or one of the spouses belongs to an 
 
25 Hussein Ali Agrama, Secularism, Sovereignty, Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a Secular or a Religious State?, 
53 COMP. STUD. IN SOC. & HIST., 495&517, 495–523 (2006). 
26 WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHARI`A: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS, 271 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), (2009). 
27 Officially recognized non-Muslim religious communities under Egyptian law are four Orthodox 
Christian  
communities (Coptic, Greek, Armenian, and Syrian), seven Catholic communities (Coptic, Greek, 
Armenian, Syrian, Maronite, Chaldean, Latin), all Protestant denominations under one community, and two 
dwindling Jewish communities (Karaitic and Rabbinic). Baha’is and Jehovah’s Witnesses constitute the 
most notable unrecognized religious minorities. See Berger (2001) at 96. 
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unrecognized non-Muslim community, like the Baha’i community, Islamic law of 
personal status becomes the law that governs their marriage.  
In contrast, the Christian and Jewish personal status laws only apply in cases where 
spouses share both the same religion and sect.  Such hierarchical legal pluralism is 
sanctioned by article 2 of the Egyptian constitution (2014) which stipulates that “Islam is 
the religion of the State and Arabic is its official language. The principles of Islamic 
Sharia are the main source of legislation”,28 and article 3 which stipulates that “the 
principles of Christian and Jewish Sharia of Egyptian Christians and Jews are the main 
source of legislations that regulate their respective personal status, religious affairs, and 
selection of spiritual leaders.”29  
The Muslim personal status code represents the majoritarian norms of national identity, 
while the Coptic personal status code is framed as the exception. A clear example of this 
is that non-Muslim family laws may not be applied if they violate Egyptian "public 
policy" which itself has been repeatedly equated in the Egyptian legal literature with 
principles which are “essential” in Islamic law.30 Accordingly, it is established that 
Islamic law of personal status is the state law and the main framework for Egyptian 
personal status laws.  
All the other laws governing other religious minorities are acknowledged as customary 
laws and are sanctioned under “plurality of religious laws (ta’addud al-shara`i’)” as it is 
generally referred to in the Egyptian legal literature.31 Maurits Berger even argues that it 
is more accurate to refer to this as the “duality of family laws” instead of the “plurality of 
family laws,” as commonly referred to in contemporary Egyptian legal doctrine.32 This is 
because a clear and distinct difference is drawn between the family laws for Muslims and 
the family laws for non-Muslims in the current Egyptian legal system. In what follows, I 
 
28 EGY CONST. 2014, Chapter I, art II. 
29 EGY CONST. 2014, Chapter I, art III. 
30 Maurits Berger, Public Policy and Islamic Law: The Modern Dhimmī in Contemporary Egyptian Family, 
8 ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY, 88, 88-136 (2001). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 123. 
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interrogate this legal hierarchy that developed with modern legal technologies, focusing 
on how Egypt has maintained pluralistic personal status codes until today.  
C. To Secularize or not to Secularize: the Egyptian Legal Framework and 
Modern Legal Technologies  
As Saba Mahmood has famously argued, the process of secularization involved a 
reconceptualization of religion that was “modeled on a dominant understanding of 
religion rooted in the majoritarian religious tradition.”33 Secularism does not always 
imply having a firewall separation between religion and state.  It is a process whereby 
religion and the state are intertwined together, producing the paradoxes and 
contradictions of modern nation-states. While secularism disentangles religion from 
politics, it relegates it to the private sphere, consequently cohering religion as an integral 
aspect of individual and collective identity. Building on this point, the paradoxes 
produced by the secularization of a deeply religious society like Egypt, was one of the 
results of handing over the private sphere to the religious authority in exchange for 
eradicating their authority over civic and political affairs. Hussein Agrama even argues 
that the current practice of secularism, brought on by the modernizing project in Egypt, 
promotes the politicization of religion. He highlights three features that underscore the 
centrality of the modern state, and especially its legal power, for secularism:  the active 
principle of secularism, a public/private distinction, and a rule of law framework.34   
In Egypt, and in other Muslim-majority countries as well, the perseverance of religion-
based pluralistic personal status laws is not simply the outcome of an incomplete 
secularization attempt. It also cannot be explained as simply a remnant of the era of 
Islamic rule or as a symptom of the deeply religious ethos of Middle Eastern societies as 
has been widely argued by some scholars of the Middle East. For instance, Herbert J. 
Liebesny has previously argued that the “continued existence of differing personal status 
law for various communities in one country is… an example of the survival of an 
institution based on principles traceable from ancient times to the present. It is also an 
 
33 Saba Mahmood, Sectarian Conflict and Family Law in Contemporary Egypt, 39 AMERICAN 
ETHNOLOGIST, 59, 54-62 (2012). 
34 AGRAMA, QUESTIONING SECULARISM, Supra note 19 at 72.  
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example of the adaptation of a long-standing legal principle to the religion-based legal 
system of Islam.”35 Moreover, the perseverance of religion-based family laws cannot be 
solely explained as an outcome of the colonial powers’ willingness to grant religious 
autonomy to colonized subjects in exchange for secularizing all other bodies of law.  
The underlying assumption of these arguments is that if all bodies of law in the Middle 
East were completely secularized, then the patriarchal attitudes that exists today in the 
domain of the family will diminish. Clearly, this is an inadequate account that fails to 
historically address the transformations in religious-based personal status laws over the 
years. More philosophically, it fails to address the changing conceptions of ‘the family’ 
itself as it bargained its terrains between the intimate and public. It would be a mistake to 
assume that if the colonial powers had enforced secularization in all areas of law, the 
problems of religious strife and gender inequality would have disappeared. I am also not 
interested in engaging with a hypothetical situation. I merely want to look at the material 
transformations in personal status laws that took place in congruence with the 
modernization process.  
Secularism and the codification processes simultaneously transformed Shari’a from a 
system of decentralized rules administrated by local muftis and qadis into a codified 
system enforced by a centralized state. This is a chapter in Egypt’s history where 
religious-based family law came to be confined to the realm of the “private”, as well as 
reduced to the unit of the “family”, and thus was “no longer a tool for the execution of 
divine law but one of the techniques of modern governance and sexual regulation.”36  
The modern nation-state became the arbiter of majority-minority relations and in the 
process, shaped the boundaries between religious communities through legislation.  As 
Talal Asad notes, the colonial powers’ willingness to grant religious autonomy when it 
comes to family matters to their colonial subjects was not so much a sign of their 
tolerance of their subjects’ religion rather it was a part of “the secular formula for 
 
35 Herbert J. Liebesny, Comparative Legal History: Its Role in the Analysis of Islamic and Modern Near 
Eastern 
Legal Institutions, 20 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 41, 38-52 (1972). 
36 Saba Mahmood, Sexuality and Secularism in Religion in THE SECULAR, AND THE POLITICS OF 
SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, 52 (Linell E. Cady & Tracy Fessenden ed, Columbia University Press, 2013), 
(2013). 
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privatizing religion.”37 This helped uphold the distinction between the public and the 
private—the most central tenant of secularism.  
Agrama explains the “active principle of secularism” as the principle that “the state has 
the power and authority to decide what should count as essentially religious and what 
scope can it have in social life.”38 This does not necessarily mean that the state gets to 
decide on matters of religious dogma, but it means that it can decide what doctrine is 
essentially a religious matter.39 More concretely, the state is authorized to distinguish 
between the "civil' and “religious" dimensions of an act, such as marriage, and “on that 
basis, decide whether the act is enforceable, punishable, or otherwise deserving of 
protection or exemption under the law.”40 Hence, the modern nation-state gets to 
constantly draw the lines between what it deems a “religious” matter and what it deems a 
“secular” matter, while preserving its sole authority to do so.41   
The active principle of secularism enabled the Egyptian state to deem matters of personal 
status such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance as matters belonging the 
realm of “religion” or as matters of religious dogma while simultaneously deeming 
matters such as financial contracts and criminal offenses as “civil” matters that should be 
governed by secular laws. Moreover, it was the artificial legal separation between the 
public/private spheres that came with the secularization process that provided the 
justification for why family matters should be governed according to one’s religious 
affiliation. By upholding the public/private distinction, the Egyptian state was able to rule 
that family matters belong to the realm of the “private”. Thus, they should be governed 
by the personal status laws that are based on one’s religious affiliation, while criminal 
conduct, for example, should belong to the realm of the “public”, and should therefore be 
governed by a secular criminal code.  
This thesis examines how different authoritarian regimes have utilized these different 
legal technologies in order to maintain patriarchal family structures and govern different 
 
37 ASAD, Supra note 18, at 228.  
38 AGRAMA, QUESTIONING SECULARISM, Supra note 19, at 72. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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religious communities living under their rule in a way that serve their own interests.  
These regimes have exploited their authority to decide what should count as essentially a 
religious matter and utilized the modern artificial separation between the public and 
private sphere in order to maintain religious-based personal status laws as they are today.  
In what follows, I explore the historical development of both the Muslim and the Coptic 
personal status laws and the impact that this historical process had on women’s rights in 
both communities. I argue that one of the main outcomes of modernizing the Egyptian 
legal system was putting in place a “glass ceiling” for progressive reforms when it came 
to questions of gender equality under both the Muslim and Coptic personal status laws. 
This has enabled the state to continue to limit interfaith marriages and keep its legal ban 
and bureaucratic restrictions on interfaith marriage in place. 
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III. A Feminist Analysis of the Modernization of the Muslim and Coptic Personal 
Status Laws  
The delegation of family matters to religious intuitions in Egypt, namely al-Azhar and the 
Coptic Orthodox Church, for many decades has actively contributed to making any calls 
for women’s rights highly contested by both communities. In this chapter, I first outline 
the historical development of the Muslim personal status code. Second, I address the 
impact that such a historical process had on the discriminatory gender practices in the 
Muslim family today. Finally, I conduct an analogous discussion of the development of 
the Coptic personal status law and how it led to many forms of gender discrimination 
experienced by Coptic women, particularly when it comes to divorce. Essentially, I 
interrogate how both religious institutions, along with the state, have redefined the sphere 
of the family to the detriment of women.  
A. The Modernization of the Muslim Personal Status Law  
There were two main processes that transformed the Egyptian Muslim family law: the 
first process was the reorganization of the Sharia court system, which took place in the 
mid-nineteenth century and the second process was the codification of Muslim family 
law, which took place over the first few decades of the twentieth century.42 The 
reorganization of the Sharia court system started in 1835, with the creation of the position 
of the Grand Mufti (Mufti al-Diyar al-Misriyya). The appointment of the Grand Mufti 
marked one of earliest steps taken by the Egyptian modern state to assert its control over 
the religious institution in its quest towards secularization. 43 This reorganization of the 
Sharia court system was then further asserted through the procedural laws of 1856, 1880, 
and 1897.44 Eventually, these procedural laws led to what Kenneth Cuno calls the 
“Hanafization” of the Sharia Courts (i.e. adaptation of the Hanafi madhab).45  
 
42 KENNETH M. CUNO, MODERNIZING MARRIAGE: FAMILY, IDEOLOGY, AND LAW IN 
NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY EGYPT, 123 (Syracuse University Press, 2015), 
(2015). 
43 JASMINE MOUSSA, COMPETING FUNDAMENTALISMS AND EGYPTIAN WOMEN’S FAMILY 
RIGHTS, 119 (Brill, 2011), (2011). 
44 CUNO, Supra note 27, at 123. 
45 Id. 
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Before the “Hanafization” process took place, Muslims had the option to choose from the 
different Sharia courts, which could issue a ruling based on any of the normative rules of 
the four major Sunni schools of law known as madahhab (i.e Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, 
Hanbali). The “reorganization of the Sharia court system” process inevitably eliminated 
the flexibility that was granted to Muslims for centuries; Muslims could no longer go 
“forum shopping” or “venue shopping” as they no longer can seek recourse in the school 
of law that best suited their interests.46 However, it must be noted that all four Sunni 
schools of law have ruled earlier that a Muslim woman could not marry a non-Muslim 
unless he would convert to Islam. This means that even before the so-called 
“Hanafization” process, a Muslim woman still could not marry a non-Muslim man.  
The main purpose of reorganization of the Sharia court system was “to make the 
application of the law more predictable and uniform, a hallmark of modern legal 
systems.”47 The introduction of the procedural laws of 1856, 1880, and 1897 led to the 
encouragement and eventually requirement of the use of documentary evidence, such as a 
written marriage contract, in legal proceedings.48. By the year 1911, “the courts would 
not hear any claims regarding marriage or divorce that were not supported by official 
documents.”49  
Eventually, this slowly led to the codification process that took place in the 1920s. As 
discussed earlier, the modernization of the Egyptian legal system also entailed its 
secularization. Yet, this secularization simply never extended to the Egyptian personal 
status laws. Only the codification process extended to personal status-related matters, 
ultimately leading to the mummification of the religious rules pertaining to family 
matters. For decades, the application of Sharia was flexible as religious rulings were 
issued based on a multitude of sources, opinions and interpretations.50 Today, Muslim 
family laws have come to represent a commitment to a codified, and hence essentially 
rigid body of law.51 
 
46 Id. at 123 & 124  
47 Id. at 125 
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In summary, Islamic law under the modern Egyptian state went from being a dominant 
system existing within the confines of an Islamic state to a subordinate system existing 
within an overall secularized legal system made up of legal transplants from European 
legal codes. Today, after having lost jurisdiction over most other areas of law, Islamic 
law lives on primarily through the Muslim personal status laws (family law).52  
B. Muslim Personal Status Laws and Women 
Ijtihad (legal reasoning) is an Islamic legal term that refers to “the exertion of mental 
energy in the search for a legal opinion to the extent that the faculties of the jurist become 
incapable of further effort."53 Ijtihad is based on the assumption that jurists possess the 
needed knowledge and competence in order to develop new rules of law through 
reasoning from Sharia’s primary sources.54 Sharia has two primary sources: the Qur'an 
(Muslim's holy book), the Sunna (Prophet Muhammad's sayings and behavior). A feature 
of Sunni jurisprudence, is that, unlike its Shi’i counterpart, it “reserves the right of ijtihad 
to a few 'ulama' (religious scholars) alone, who are considered well versed in sharia 
(divine law) and fiqh (human legal theorization).”55 The rulings of the four Sunni 
jurisprudential schools known as madahhab (i.e Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali), which 
were coined in the eighth and ninth centuries ad., are generally considered as the 
authoritative interpretations of the sources of Sunni Islamic law.56 
Many authoritative Islamic scholars argue that the gates of ijtihad were effectively closed 
by the late ninth century.57 However, many Islamic feminists today, put forth the 
argument that the gates of ijtihad were never really closed and that there is an urgent need 
to utilize this Islamic methodology in order to fight patriarchal norms enshrined today in 
modern family laws. Amira Mashhour, for example, argues that Sharia “posits an 
 
52 Jasmine Moussa, The Reform of Shari’a-derived Divorce Legislation in Egypt: International Standards 
and the Cultural Debate, 1 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW COMMENTARY, 11, 1-31 (2005). 
53 Wael B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?, 16 INT. JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 3, 
3-41, (1984). 
54 L. ALI KHAN & HISHAM M. RAMADAN, CONTEMPORARY IJTIHAD: LIMITS AND 
CONTROVERSIES, 1 (Edinburgh University Press, 2011), (2011). 
55 Fatima Sadiqi, The Potential Within, in Adjudicating Family Law in Muslim Courts, 121 (1st edition, 
Routledge, 2016).  
56 MOUSSA, COMPETING FUNDAMENTALISMS, Supra note 28, at 122.  
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evolutionary quality based on ijtihad to interpret the texts in their socioeconomic and 
historical contexts and to compare their relevance to the contemporary context as a means 
of responding to the needs of the society and coping with social changes.”58 She 
continues her argument by saying that “applying Ijthad, or feminist Ijtihad in particular, 
based on justice, which is the core value of Islam, one can fulfill gender equality to its 
fullest.”59  
Another example is Islamic feminist Omaima Abou Bakr who refers to the recent works 
of Islamic feminists as an “uninterpretation” rather than a “re-interpretations.”60  She 
explains that Islamic feminist project is a “continuous attempt to un-interpret past gender 
biased readings done by male jurists to come up with new interpretations that push for 
gender equality from and within Islam itself.”61 She argues that Islamic feminism “has 
proven the possibility of undoing the doings of patriarchy.”62 Other Islamic feminists, 
such as Kecia Ali63 and Ziba Mir Hosseini64, also problematize Islamic medieval 
jurisprudence by arguing that it was solely based on male-centered perspectives.65  Both 
of them argue that male jurists were influenced by the patriarchal society present at the 
time which ultimately impacted their rulings on matters pertaining to gender relations 
within the family.66 Nonetheless, the work of Islamic feminists and their utilization of 
ijtihad to come up with new interpretations, has been widely controversial especially in 
recent Egyptian history.67 
 
58 Amira Mashhour, Islamic Law and Gender Equality: Could There Be a Common Ground?: A Study of 
Divorce and Polygamy in Sharia Law and Contemporary Legislation in Tunisia and Egypt, 27 HUMAN 
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64 See for example Ziba Mir Hosseini, The Construction of Gender in Islamic Legal Thought and 
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The codification process essentially stripped Sharia of two of its most valuable aspects: 
its adaptability to society’s needs and the flexibility of its rulings.  By codifying medieval 
Islamic jurisprudence mainly in the realm of the family, the Egyptian state has effectively 
made medieval patriarchal norms, inherent in the rulings of the four classical madahabs, 
the primary surviving legacy of Islamic law in the current Egyptian legal system. As a 
result of this, many proposals that call for reforming the personal status code by 
eradicating male dominance in family laws were and still are met with vigorous 
opposition by religious contenders. Those religious contenders often framed such reforms 
as attempts to Europeanize the Egyptian society and as assaults to the last “Islamic” laws 
standing.  
For instance, there was a proposed reform put forth by the Ministry of Social Affairs’ 
draft law, in 1945, which attempted to restrict both divorce and polygamy.68 The draft 
law required a Sharia judge’s permission as a perquisite for a polygamous marriage. 
Before giving out such permission, the Sharia judge had to first investigate whether a 
married man had the financial ability to support more than one wife.69 The draft law also 
sought to limit divorce through requiring a court order for it and it stipulated that 
violators would have to pay a fine, or serve a prison term, or both.70 However, this 
proposal never saw the light of day as it was meet by rigorous opposition by religious 
contenders despite the fact that recommendations included in this proposal were justified 
within the scriptures, and were not solely based on the opinions of jurists.71 
Another example is the famous Decree-Law No.44 that President Anwar al-Sadat passed 
on June 20, 1979 without the prior approval of the Assembly. Among other things, it 
required divorce to be officially and properly registered either by a notary public or by 
the husband's acknowledgement (iqrar) and ruled that a second marriage constituted a 
harm to the first wife, and thus it was a legitimate ground for divorce, even if the wife 
 
68 Fauzi M. Najjar, Egypt's Laws of Personal Status, 10 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY, 320, 319-344 
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had not so stipulated in the marriage contract.72 Opponents of the new law referred to it 
as "Jihan al-Sadaťs law” and accused it of going against fundamental Islamic principles.73  
Muhammad A. al-Samman, spokesmen for the Muslim Brotherhood at the time, even 
mounted a vigorous attack on the new law and its supporters. He voiced his objections to 
the Law, claiming that that it was inspired by Catholicism and the West.  He further 
accused Amina al-Sa’id, an eminent Egyptian feminist who pushed for more reforms than 
those established by the mentioned Law, of being brainwashed by the West. “[T]hat West 
which you glorify is the cradle of debauchery, moral laxity, and the dissolution of the 
family. What the East has experienced in moral decline has come to it from the so-called 
'civilized west,” al-Samman addressed Amina al-Sa’id.74 The relatively limited changes 
introduced in Law No.44 of 1979 were short-lived as the legislation was later struck 
down as unconstitutional on May 4, 1985.75  
It is then clear that even moderate reforms to limit discrimination in the personal status 
laws has been often met with great resistance from religious contenders throughout 
Egypt’s modern history. Thus, it is not surprising that progressive reforms calling for 
sanctioning interfaith marriage between a Christian man and a Muslim woman, are most 
likely going to be framed today as an automatic heresy.  
There are a few possible explanations as to why many secular reforms aimed at the body 
of law dealing with personal status matters is met with so much resistance in Egypt today. 
The first possible explanation is that the Egyptian regime is more concerned with 
ensuring that the “secular” nature of the already mostly secularized fields of laws, such as 
criminal and commercial law, remains unchallenged than with fighting patriarchy in the 
realm of the family. Given that the entire Egyptian legal system was transformed into a 
more secular legal system, the religious intelligentsia were worried that family laws 
would have to go through those same changes as well. Thus, in order for secularization to 
take place, there had to be a limit drawn on any reform that could affect family laws. In 
the words of Lama Abu Odeh: 
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In order for all other laws to be secularized, family law had to represent the 
limit of, the exception to, or the sacrificial lamb of secularization… the 
Islamicity of the rules on the family came to symbolize the last bastion of a 
dismantled Islamic legal system, the reform of which threatened to flood 
Egypt with the European and the secular. Thus, attachment to medieval 
patriarchy came to mean attachment to the Islamic.76 
 
In other words, the modern Egyptian personal status law was essentially a scapegoat 
offered by the Egyptian regime to conservative religious intelligentsia to atone for 
secularizing the Egyptian law in most other areas. 
The second explanation as to why there is a special attachment to Islamic rules pertaining 
to personal status matters is that these rules are often claimed or believed to be outlined in 
greater detail in the Qur'an or sunna of the Prophet than the rules dealing with other areas 
of shari'a.77 Those who oppose reforms to the personal status laws put forth the argument 
that most Qur'anic verses have legal content that concern personal status matters and 
consequently that Islamic rules pertaining to personal status matters should be treated as 
sanctified critical components of Shari’a. As a result, any reformer that seeks to change 
these “divine commandments” is met with accusations that they are failing to respect the 
word of God. It is often argued that subjects of Shari’a, that deal with areas other than 
personal status matters, are largely the products of medieval juristic elaborations of 
principles and thus, while in theory ultimately grounded in Islamic sources, they actually 
lack any similar explicit textual authority in the Qur'an or sunna.78 Moreover, since the 
rules pertaining to these subjects are set forth in the technical language of juristic 
treatises, there is often little popular awareness of or attachment to them.  
The third explanation is that this special attachment emanates from the “deeply-ingrained 
traditions of patriarchal family organization.”79 For reasons of self-interest and to 
maintain their rights and privileges, men logically prefer to preserve the structure of the 
patriarchal family as it is.  Given that the majority of decision makers, legislators, and 
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judges in Egypt today are men, it’s only natural that they would use their powers to shape 
the law to fit their self-interest. Moreover, the modernization process, which was 
accompanied by industrialization and urbanization, had an unsettling impact on 
patriarchal control over women. Thus, men had to start relying more on law in order to 
keep women in the same traditional subordinate role they have been previously placed 
in.80 In the pre-modern era, forms of informal social control substituted for restrictive 
legal sanctions against women both in the household and the public sphere.81 Thus, it can 
be argued that now Islamic shari'a rules of personal status have taken on a more 
important function today than the one they had in the past.82  
In the pre-modern era, and before the codification process took place, Muslim women 
had access to different Sharia courts that applied the different schools of thought. The 
reform movement in Egypt has used the Islamic techniques of takhayyur (selection) and 
talfīq (patchwork or combination) to introduce aspects of Maliki law that were more 
favorable to the position of women in order to depart from a personal status code based 
on the Hanafi doctrine.83 It may be true that the Egyptian Muslim Personal Status Code 
overtime started to include reforms that were cherry picked from the four schools of 
thoughts; reforms that were seen at the time as favoring women’s rights and/or serving 
the interest of the state.  It also may be true that the codification process led to some 
improvement in women’s status in Egypt.84 Nevertheless, the Muslim Personal Status 
Code has yet to introduce any new ground-breaking progressive rights that women did 
not enjoy in the pre-modern era.  
 One of the major downfalls of codifying the family laws was limiting the alternatives 
that women previously had which allowed various Egyptian regimes to then introducing 
what was previously offered by one Sharia court or another as novel reforms. As Lama 
Abu Odeh argues, “while secularizing the legal system in Egypt through European 
transplants allowed for the possibility of either dismissing or radically reorganizing 
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various elements of the doctrine on the family inherited from medieval Islamic 
jurisprudence to make it more progressive, it was the same 
secularization/Europeanization process that placed limits on and defined the ceiling of 
progressive reforms.”85   
The codification process ultimately helped put in place a “glass ceiling” for progressive 
reforms; today any new reforms to the personal status code have to not only be justified 
by Sharia, but also go through institutional complications of a modern legal system. 
Thus, “radical” reforms such as abolishing the man’s unconditional unilateral right to 
divorce, outlawing polygamy, criminalizing marital rape, or allowing Muslim women to 
marry non-Muslim men fail to pass a long road paved with legal impediments, political 
maneuvers and institutional checks and balances. 
Notably, there are different methods of interpretation of Sharia law in different Muslim-
majority countries. A major feature of Sharia is that it is not fixed and that it has 
constantly changed over time. A look at the progressive Muslim Code of Personal Status 
of Tunisia known as the Majallah and the more conservative Muslim personal status laws 
of Egypt will support that claim. The reforms that were introduced overtime to the 
Majallah did not completely reject Islamic values and principles but sought to 
“modernize them by using a distinct interpretative approach to Islam that is unique in the 
Muslim world.”86  Interestingly, the most recent reform passed on the laws governing 
personal status in Tunisia was lifting the decades-old ban on interfaith marriage between 
a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man.87 
C. The Modernization of the Coptic Personal Status Law  
Currently there are fifteen religion-based family laws (one for Muslims, two for Jews, 
and twelve for different Christian denominations) in Egypt, however, it is the Coptic-
Christian family law that is most significant in defining Egyptian interreligious affairs 
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and politics. Given the fact that majority of the population in Egypt and other Arab 
countries are Muslims, academic literature has dealt more extensively with the Muslim 
personal status law. For the purpose of this thesis, however, the same attention must be 
given to the evolution of Coptic Personal Status Law.  
 
Ryan Rowberry and John Khalil chart the distinctive phases of Coptic personal status law 
over the past two millennia, using interviews with Coptic clergy and individuals, various 
primary sources, and a multitude of secondary sources. The authors argue that reforms to 
Coptic Personal Status Law in the nineteenth century were largely a result of political 
changes.88  In 1855, under Sa'id Pasha, Copts were finally granted equal rights of 
citizenship and were no longer obliged to pay tax (jizyah). In 1856, article 9 of the Treaty 
of Paris, reaffirmed the Coptic Church's governance over Coptic personal status law. 
Nevertheless, in 1874, in response to petitions by lay Copts, Butrus Ghali Pasha 
somewhat decentralized control over Coptic affairs; he issued a decree allowing laymen 
the right to form a Maglis al-milli (Coptic Community Council) which had the authority 
to deal with cases related to personal status issues of Copts.89  
 
Inevitably, the Coptic Community Council and the church clergy often clashed, because 
church leaders felt that their authority was being challenged. In 1938, the Council 
adopted an ordinance that expanded the scope of permissible divorce that stated ten 
suitable reasons for divorce including: serious domestic violence, a three-year period of 
separation due to untenable marriage conditions, and incompatibility.90 Although this 
ordinance was the first attempt to codify Coptic personal status law, church leaders 
disagreed with its “liberal” justifications for divorce.91  
 
Legal reforms introduced in the 1950s quickly ended the dispute between the Council and 
church leaders, while simultaneously undermining the Coptic Church's jurisdiction over 
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personal status law issues.92 In 1955, Egypt passed Family Status Law No. 462, 
applicable to all Egyptians. However, this law eradicated Maglis al-Milli courts, 
“replacing them with state-run personal status courts based upon religious laws.”93 Law 
No. 462 also constrained the scope of cases that could be heard in personal status courts 
using non-Muslim law and determined that mixed denominational marriages were to fall 
under the jurisdiction of Shari'a law. It also restricted the Coptic Personal Status Code to 
matters of “betrothal, marriage, and the dissolution of marriage through divorce or 
separation”,94 whereas the Coptic Personal Status Code had formerly “embraced all 
issues relevant to marriage, divorce, separation, alimony, inheritance, financial rights, 
guardianship, tutelage, and custody of children.”95  Rowberry and Khalil argue that 
judges of the personal status courts, who were predominately Muslim, appeared to “lean 
more on their cultural understandings of Shari'a rather than strictly apply Coptic personal 
status laws as divorces were readily granted.”96  
 
From the year 1938, when al-Maglis al-milli (Coptic Community Council) adopted the 
ordinance that expanded the scope of permissible divorce discussed above, up until the 
year 2008, the Coptic personal status code remained unchanged.97 Until 2008, Coptic 
Christians in Egypt battled to get a divorce under the grounds permitted by this ordinance 
especially under Pope Shenouda III.98  Although national courts used to grant Coptic 
Christians divorces in accordance with the 1938 laws, the Church still viewed couples 
divorced by the national courts as still married and refused to grant them license to 
remarry.99 In the year 2008, the Coptic Church eventually stepped in to amend the 
controversial 1938 ordinance and the new amendment limited the grounds for divorce to 
only adultery and change of religion.100  
 
92 Id. at 119. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 119&120. 
97 Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, Divorce and Remarriage of Orthodox Copts in Egypt: The 2008 State 
Council Ruling and the Amendment of the 1938 Personal Status Regulations, 18 ISLAMIC LAW AND 
SOCIETY, 356, 356-386 (2008). 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 364 
100 Id. at 356. 
 25 
 
 
The 2008 revisions were viewed as unconstitutional by some Coptic activists and they 
even filed for an appeal against them. In an attempt to appease the Coptic Church, the 
Egyptian national courts have continuously refused to pass a ruling on that appeal.101 In 
2010, the Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court issued a decision requiring Pope 
Shenouda III to pay damages to Magdi William who sued the Coptic Church over its 
refusal to issue a certificate to re-marry after he divorced his wife.102 However, Pope 
Shenouda never actually paid those damages until his death in 2012.103  Post-colonial 
Egyptian regimes, especially Mubarak’s regime, helped the Church maintain its financial 
independence and to ignore court rulings concerning Copts’ personal affairs. In many 
ways, this shows how the Coptic Church often times can act as a state within a state.   
 
Under Egypt’s modern authoritarian regimes, the Coptic Church became the only 
legitimate representative of Egypt’s Copts. Today, the Church has two main interests: the 
first one is ensuring its institutional independence vis-à-vis state institutions and the 
second is keeping its monopoly as the only legitimate channel responsible for speaking 
on behalf of the Coptic community.104 The Coptic Church’s ability to have state-like 
qualities was made possible through the perseverance of legal pluralism in the realm of 
family laws and its relationship with the Egyptian state. Its control over the Coptic 
personal status matters became an arena that symbolizes the power struggle between it 
and the Egyptian state. The end result is that members of the Coptic community are now 
caught in the middle between these two forces and their two loyalties.  These specific 
points will be further addressed in detail in the fourth chapter of this thesis.  
 
 
 
101 Azza Soliman, THE INTERSECTIONALITY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE EGYPTIAN 
CHRISTIAN WOMAN (Lecture organized by EIPR, Cairo, 26 Nov. 2017).  
102 Thaddeus M. Baklinski, Egyptian Coptic Pope Shenouda III Fined For Stand against Divorce, 
LIFESITE, Sept. 27, 2010. https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/egyptian-coptic-pope-shenouda-iii-fined-
for-stand-against-divorce  
103 Soliman, Supra note 81.  
104 Georges Fahmi, the Coptic Church and Politics in Egypt, CARNEGIE MIDDLE EAST CENTER, 
December 18, 2014. 
http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/12/18/coptic-church-and-politics-in-egypt-pub-57563  
 26 
 
D. The Coptic Personal Status Laws and Women 
The Egyptian state imposes an ultimatum on Copts wishing to obtain a divorce: 1) make 
an adultery claim, or 2) change confession or religion, in which case they would have to 
resort to Shar’ia to obtain divorce. Egyptian activist, Ola Shahba, notes that Christian 
women in Egypt pay a heftier price for the Coptic Church’s rigid stance on divorce than 
their male counterparts.105 This is because the first option would entail fabricating claims 
of adultery or admitting to have committed adultery, which, understandably, is extremely 
difficult for women living in a conservative society such as Egypt. As for the second 
option, Coptic women are still the main victims of it. Given the patriarchal nature of 
Egyptian society, Coptic women are usually the ones forced to change their confession or 
religion in order to obtain a divorce especially when they are stuck in an abusive 
marriage. For example, Egyptian activist and feminist Dr. Azza Soliman has noted that 
Christian women who go to report the abuse by their husbands in police stations are often 
told to resolve their marital problems in the Church because the police fears that this 
might spark sectarian tensions if they interfere in a Coptic household.106  
 
There was even a recent case in 2011 that involved a formerly Coptic woman who 
identified herself to a local TV station as Abeer Talaat. She was an Assiut resident who 
said she converted to Islam to escape her abusive husband. She converted in September 
2010 and then filed for divorce.107 Months later, after Talaat had agreed to marry another 
man, someone reported her to the church authorities. Talaat said that members of the 
church then forced her into seclusion and encouraged her to embrace Christianity and go 
back to her husband.108 A group of Muslims heard of her captivity, according to local 
media, and clashed with several Copts in the neighborhood of Imbaba, where Talaat was 
allegedly being held. It all went downhill when rumors circulated that a group of Salafi 
Muslims was coming to attack the church in Imbaba. An armed battle started between the 
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Muslims and Copts residents within plain sight of the police forces who stood by and 
allowed for the violence to break out.109 At least twelve people died and ten others were 
injured.110 
 
Abeer, like many Coptic women in her shoes, could not escape her abusive marriage 
without first converting to Islam (the state’s religion). However, her basic right to convert 
to the majority’s religion is viewed by conservative members of the Coptic community as 
an insult to the entire community. Her free choice to convert to be with a Muslim man is 
seen as “tarnishing” her community’s honor. Thus, conservative Christian forces wanted 
her back in order to “restore” the community’s honor. On the other hand, conservative 
members within the Muslim community often frame conversions to Islam as a victory for 
the whole community. They do not want to allow the Coptic minority to strip them off 
their new-found “trophy” female convert. Talaat’s case in many ways demonstrates how 
conservative forces from both the Christian and Muslim communities often end up 
engaging in violent clashes over women’s bodies. These conservative forces are 
emboldened by the state’s legal system that aims to restrict romantic and sexual 
relationships in a way that strikes a balance between ensuing the hegemony of the 
Muslim majority and appeasing the Coptic minority. 
 
Conservative forces from both communities essentially strip the women involved in 
sectarian incidents from their agency. They both want to decide for their women which 
God they get to pray for and which person they get to go to bed with. The state only steps 
in when its interests is at stake, and in turn, it also treats women as subjects completely 
void of agency; it views them as the property of the religious community they belong to. 
This is made clear by the fact that in most high profile incidents of sectarian involving a 
Christian woman converting to Islam to be with a Muslim man, the state often ends up 
returning her back to the Church. On the other hand, in sectarian incidents involving a 
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Muslim woman fleeing her house to be in a romantic or sexual relationship with a 
Christian man, the state ends up forcibly handing her back to her Muslim family.  
 
Talaat’s case also sheds light on the fact that Christian women from poor classes in 
society have to pay an even heftier price when it comes to divorce than their class 
privileged counterparts. Dr. Azza Soliman notes that throughout her work as the founder 
of the Centre for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance (CEWLA) and her engagement 
with certain Church clergymen, she found that the divorce process for poor Christian 
women is radically harder than that for rich Christian women.111 She notes that Coptic 
clergymen use a drastically different tone with a poor Christian woman who wants a 
divorce, because her husband beats her, than the tone they use with a rich Christian 
woman with the same problem.112 She even mentions that sometimes divorce can be 
secured through making large sums of donations to the Church and through high-end 
connections with the clergymen.113 Not only do poorer Christian women experience 
restrictions when they seek divorce because of their religion, they also face difficulties 
because of their class as they cannot bypass the restrictions posed by the church on 
divorce. They additionally have to deal with gender discriminatory practices and 
patriarchal norms that sometimes, for example, expect a woman to stay in an abusive 
relationship for the sake of her children. 
 
Christian women from poorer classes experience discrimination in ways that are both 
similar to and different from those experienced by Muslim women, Christian men, and 
even privileged Christian women. In many ways, they experience triple-discrimination as 
they face the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of class, sex, 
and religion. For one, Coptic women from poorer classes share the same concerns that 
other poor Egyptians have about their inability to provide for food, medicine, and other 
basic needs for themselves and their families. They also share the concerns of other 
Egyptian women who face sexual harassment in the public space, domestic violence 
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inside the household, patriarchal practices within the family, lack of access to education, 
etc. Finally, they also face the every-day acts of discrimination as Copts living within a 
predominately Muslim society where Copts often face discrimination both in public and 
in private and are also sometimes subjected to senseless acts of sectarian violence. 
 
Consequently, I argue that there is a need to adopt a more intersectional approach to 
feminism in Egypt, particularly one that takes, incorporates and acknowledges the 
religious affiliation of women and their socioeconomic statuses, when advocating for 
legal reforms in favor of women. This is because intersectional feminism will further help 
in scoring more substantive rights for all Egyptian women and not just class-privileged 
Muslim women. The problem is that when women’s rights groups in Egypt secure a few 
conservative gains for Muslim women with regards to the Muslim personal law status, 
these gains are celebrated as achievements for all Egyptian “women” and are viewed as a 
call for celebration for the mainstream feminist movement in Egypt. An intersectional 
approach to feminism will somewhat remedy this the situation as it will shed light on 
Christian women’s struggles in Egypt as well and their limited access to divorce.  In 
many ways this may help in easing off the tensions surrounding sectarian violence that 
pertains to interfaith romantic and sexual relationships.  
  
In short, Coptic family law was transformed by the modernization process just like its 
Muslim counterpart. There are two main similarities between both family laws. First, 
they both have institutionalized laws that disproportionately discriminate against women. 
Second, they both have institutionalized the modern concept of the family as a 
sociopolitical unit necessary to the reproduction of the national and communal life and 
the preservation of religious identity. Amira Sonbol, for instance, notes how marriage 
contracts in thirteenth century Egypt did not conceptualize the concept of the “family” in 
the same manner that modern personal status codes do today. That these earlier marriage 
contracts did not necessary reflect that the purpose of marriage is to start a family (usra) 
and have children as they did not draw any connections between the spouses and 
family.114  In contrast with modern discourses on Sharia, the family was not understood 
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as being the “social unit necessary to the maslaha (comparative advantage) of the 
community.”115  
 
On the other hand, the major difference between both family laws is that the Muslim 
family law “represents majoritarian national identity,” while the Coptic family law “is 
exceptional in the distinct norms and mores it embodies, and in its subjection to 
communal sovereignty—most potently symbolized in the Coptic Orthodox Church.”116 
This carries additional consequences for Christian women who have to deal with sexism 
within their already persecuted religious community. An analogous conundrum is 
highlighted by Kimberlé Crenshaw in her paper “Mapping the Margins” where she talks 
about the combined effects of patriarchy and racism black women have to endure in the 
United States. Crenshaw argues that Black women are situated within “at least two 
subordinated groups that frequently pursue conflicting political agendas”117 and that 
Black women’s concerns remain inadequately represented by both.  She notes how “some 
critics allege that feminism has no place within communities of color, that gender issues 
are internally divisive.”118 Comparable attitudes towards feminism could also be 
observed in the Coptic Christian community in Egypt and that’s precisely why there is a 
need for intersectionality in Egypt. 
 
The Coptic Orthodox Church adopts traditional views regarding female roles within the 
family and concerning women’s sexuality. For instance, the husband-wife relationship in 
the Coptic Orthodox religious discourse is modeled after the relationship of Christ to his 
church.119 A Christian woman “feels man is her equal without forgetting to be willingly 
submissive to her husband, not out of fear or humiliation but out of love and respect for 
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him just as the church submits to Christ of its free will.”120 The idea that is pushed 
forward by the Coptic Church is that Coptic women should be more concerned about 
their relationship with God and being good Christian daughters, wives, and mothers to 
serve their community better rather than preoccupy themselves with issues such as 
“women’s rights”.  The former Coptic Patriarch Shenouda III even said in one of his 
articles that “many speak about a woman’s rights, but the more pertinent issue is that a 
woman is virtuous.”121  Furthermore, some conservative members of the Coptic 
community would argue that feminism has no place in the Coptic community; that 
discussing domestic violence in the Coptic family and Coptic divorce laws would only 
cause internal divisiveness in the Coptic community. One of the consequences of this is 
that there is a marked absence of social movements dedicated to calling for the rights of 
Coptic women. On the other hand, there are movements that are solely dedicated to 
calling for the rights of the Coptic community in Egypt, such as the Maspero Youth 
Union.  
 
The next chapter discusses yet another outcome that the modernization of the Egyptian 
legal system had on personal status laws, with a view to understanding how the Egyptian 
state managed to limit interfaith unions in Egypt. This outcome was the delegation of 
personal status laws, or by extension the unit of the “family”, with the inordinate weight 
of being the site of the reproduction and preservation of religious identity. The next 
chapter explores how, under the auspices of the modern Egyptian state, the delegation of 
family and religion to the private sphere has helped in shaping sectarian identities and 
defining the majority-minority relation in Egypt.  
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IV.  Legal Plurality, the Family, and the Coptic Community  
A. The “Family” as a Legal Category 
It was around 1875 that the personal status law was first established, thereby marking a 
significant shift toward “the family” as a legal category.122 It was by the end of the 
nineteenth century that the unit of the “family” became a key subject of public discourse 
and government policy. In this respect, Egyptian legislators followed the footsteps of 
Western European countries. The term “family,” referring to a domestic group 
comprising a couple and their children, acquired its modern connotation in Western 
Europe during the early nineteenth century.123 It was during the late 1880s, that new 
ideologies about the idea of the “family” started to be disseminated and debated among 
literate Egyptians, and by the 1920s its main tenets ad gained widespread acceptance in 
the middle and upper classes.124 The idea was that the conjugal family was the main unit 
of society and thus the welfare of the society depended on the stability and soundness of 
the family life. This new conception of the family emphasized this unit as first and 
foremost a reproductive unit.125 The off springs of the family are the future of the nation, 
and consequently the modern state should strive to install desirable characteristics in 
those children.126 In other words, the stability and harmony of the family needed to be 
maintained as it was viewed as the social basis for the coherence and well-being of the 
entire nation.  
Consequently, even though the family was to fall under the domain of the private sphere, 
it still remained as a key site for social reform projects taken by the Egyptian modern 
regimes. For example, in monarchial Egypt, “the family was one of the most important 
tents of nationalist and state agendas.”127 As Saba Mahmood notes, one of the main 
effects of the modernization process was the transformation of the concept of family from 
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a loose network of kin relations to the “nuclear family with its attendant notions of 
conjugality, companionate marriage, and bourgeoisie love.”128 The family, under the 
auspices of the modern state, was seen as the nuclear unit responsible for the 
reproduction of the society and the nation. The state of the Egyptian family was regarded 
as a site where the moral, spiritual, and material wellbeing of the state rested and thus it 
“became central to debates over how best to ensure the (re)production of healthy, 
“modern” Egyptian citizens.”129 Debates revolving around family and marriage at the 
time were essentially about the future of Egyptian society and the nation as a whole. 
Egypt remained under British occupation throughout the first half of the 20th century up 
until 1956, when the last British forces withdrew from Egypt.  Understandably, 
nationalistic sentiments were strengthened by an enduring colonial presence. Many 
Egyptians were still threatened by the British influence over Egypt, even after the 
Unilateral Declaration of Egyptian Independence was issued on 1922, and that fear 
lingered throughout the remainder of its monarchial era. According to Historian Hanan 
Kholoussy, “many Egyptians during the monarchial era viewed the institution of 
marriage as the foundation stone of the emerging nation.”130  This has entailed many 
lasting consequences on how marriage and the family came to be perceived in the country 
up until this moment. As early as 1931, the family became associated with public order in 
the sharia and milli courts, and, by 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser declared it to be “the 
foundation of the society itself.”131 Nasser even later established Egypt’s national family 
planning program in 1966, which was the foundation stone of his state-building agenda 
and a key strategy in his plan to create an Arab socialist society.132 
Kholoussy notes that “the intention of Egyptian legislators was the ‘nationalization of 
marriage,’ that is, the creation of married subjects who would form adult, permanent, 
preferably monogamous families that, in turn, would serve as the foundation for a 
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modern nation free of social ills.”133  At the time, there were a set of proposed reforms to 
limit the marriage of minors, to curtail the ability of males to obtain divorce easily, and to 
restrict polygamy at the time.134 However, the inability to pass such reforms is an 
indicator that they were still highly disputed especially in a society where such practices 
are religiously sanctioned.135 It is hence clear why the proposed reforms adopted a 
conservative approach, as opposed to introducing more radical changes, such as 
introducing civil marriage as opposed to religious marriage, and sanctioning interfaith 
marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man. For Egyptian elite as well as 
the masses at the time, such radical changes were apparently too controversial to the 
point where they were never even considered for debate. Interfaith marriage between a 
Muslim woman and Non-Muslim man would, accordingly, not fit the state conception of 
the role of marriage in society. Interfaith marriages, in the eyes of the state, would cause 
an undesired social instability in a time of political uncertainty. The postcolonial moment 
required national unity, cohered by moral and religious dogma and juxtaposed against the 
iniquitous West with its secular legal system.  Moreover, it will threaten to destabilize the 
harmony of the family as children would struggle with their religious identity inside the 
household. 
Although marriage is supposed to be a private union that symbolizes personal love and 
commitment, this “intimate” union still very much participates in public order.136 As 
Nancy Cott notes marriage under the modern state has become is an institution that 
“facilitates the government’s grasp on the populace.”137 Today, one of the most important 
perquisites of the institution of marriage is public affirmation.138 It is the power invested 
in the religious clergy by the state that institutes marriage. Marriage needs a license and it 
has to be registered; it has to be legal; and to be legal it has to be sanctioned by the law. 
The law sets the terms of marriage and the state enforces them. The understanding of 
marriage as a contract between a man and a woman by which she is lawfully endowed to 
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him with the objective of forming a family and producing children was actually a new 
idea to the Egyptian legal and social sphere.139 As David M. Schneider has previously 
argued, “pre-state societies did not specifically identify ‘family’ as a unit, nor did they 
equate ‘family’ with women and children.”140  
The modern nation-state has the sovereign power to create laws- norms against which all 
individuals could be judged. At the same time, and as Foucault argues, modern society is 
a “disciplinary society”. In contrast to the blatant and coercive sovereign power, 
discipline can be described as a power mechanism that regulates the thought and behavior 
of subjects through subtle and decentralized methods. This disciplinary society is clearly 
articulated in modern institutions, whether prisons, hospitals, factories, schools, or even 
marriages –the marriage institution.  Disciplinary power entails directing subjects to the 
“right” or “normal” path and defining any action or activity that does follow this path as 
“deviant” or “abnormal”. Foucault situates the family as “the privileged locus of 
emergence for the disciplinary question of the normal and the abnormal.”141  
The Egyptian state today feels the need to protect the sanctity of marriage and the unit of 
the family from being tainted by “deviant” forms of marriage such interfaith marriages, 
especially ones where a Muslim woman is married to a non-Muslim man. Moreover, it 
also feels the need to reinforce Islam, the religion of the majority, as the state’s general 
religion.  In fact, the Egyptian judiciary have even previously ruled that children resulting 
from an interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man are to be 
removed from the custody of their parents and instead placed in the custody of a male 
Muslim guardian.142 Moreover, it previously ruled in cases were a Christian husband or 
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wife decide to convert to Islam, their minor children are to automatically identify as 
Muslims by the state regardless of the wishes of both their parents.143 
B. The Consequences of “Jamming” of both the Family and Religion to the 
Private Sphere 
Boundaries and frontiers separating between the state, civil society, and family were 
“historically invented, institutionalized, legalized, and with time, naturalized in Western 
states.”144 These artificial boundaries were later transplanted through colonialist and top-
down state-building action into the societies colonized by those western states.145 
Western states have invested much institutional and legal capital into creating those 
artificial boundaries which later enabled them to divide social life into “spheres” of 
activity.146  
The public-private distinction that emerged in congruence with modern and law and 
state-formation in the West became one of the main legal technologies used by states to 
impose social control. Saba Mahmood argues that granting the three Abrahamic religions 
in Egypt judicial autonomy over “private” family matters has created a “cathexis between 
religious identity and issues of gender and sexuality”.147 It is true that concepts such as 
religion, gender, sexuality and family have been historically intertwined, arguably 
because the unit of the family has been historically understood to be the site for 
reproduction and preservation of moral values in most cultures. However, Mahmood 
argues that “the exaggerated weight that the family commands in contemporary religious 
debates is an artifact of the state's relegation of both - family and religion- to the private 
juridical domain.”148 She further explains that “what appears to be a natural affinity 
between family values and religious morality is in fact a contingent effect of the 
privatization of religion and sexuality under modern secularism.”149  
 
143 Id. at 14&15.  
144 I FAMILY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, Supra note 103, at 26. 
145 Id. at 27. 
146 Id.at 26.  
147 Mahmood, Sectarian Conflict and Family Law in Contemporary Egypt, Supra note 18, at 58. 
148  MAHMOOD, RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE IN A SECULAR AGE, Supra note 2, at 119. 
149 Id. 
 37 
 
Given that the legal category of the “family” was never really secularized in modern 
Egypt, inevitably the personal status laws remained linked to religious identity. It can be 
argued that the Egyptian modern state’s choice to keep religious-based laws and to locate 
them almost exclusively in the domain of the family does not necessarily violate secular 
principles. In fact, one could argue that this was made easier under the secular modern 
means of governance. Secularism is not only simply only about the principle of the 
separation between the state and the church, it also “entails reordering and remaking of 
religious life and interconfessional relations in accord with specific norms, themselves 
foreign to the life of religions and people it organizes.”150 
It could be argued that forcing citizens to marry according to the religious doctrine they 
are born to is not exactly a grand expression of secularist values. However, one must 
keep in mind that at the center of secularism lies both its regulatory impulse and its 
promise of religious freedom intertwined together. Secularism posits the state as the 
neutral arbiter that gets to decide what matters should be governed by religious doctrines 
and what matters should be governed by the secular laws of the state. It’s the state gets to 
decide when to grant religious exceptions to state-mandated laws and when not to. 
Religious freedom can be described as a sum of claims, privileges, powers, and 
immunities that governs the relationship of citizens of the state on the question of 
religion. For how a state decides to allocate these sets of privileges and rights is what 
distinguishes its own model of secularism from other models. Each distribution affects 
majority/minority relations differently. The application of political secularism might 
differ heavily depending on the context.  In the case of Egypt, the state’s choice to 
conserve religious-based personal status laws strengthened religious categories as 
markers of identity that defined a person’s social purpose in the family, and in society as 
a whole.  By making the family, and by extension sexuality and gender, the locus of faith, 
religious-based family laws exacerbated the contentious nature of interreligious 
relationships in Egypt. 
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C. “Public Order” as a Justification for the Legal ban on Interfaith Marriage 
The classical Islamic legal doctrine of dhimmi, which referred to protected non-Muslim 
communities residing within the Muslim territories, in many ways influenced the current 
legal formulation of the Egyptian personal status laws. Under this legal doctrine, dhimmis 
were entitled to judicial and legislative autonomy with regards to their religious and 
personal status laws. In all other areas of law, they were bound by Islamic law. The millet 
system was closely linked to Islamic rules on the treatment of non−Muslim minorities 
(dhimmis). During the Ottoman era, a non-Muslim community was called a milla (millet) 
literally meaning “nation” and a milli court administered the religious and family law of 
each community. The same system was adopted in many nation-states emerging from the 
former Ottoman Empire. Though the Sharia and Milli courts were abolished and replaced 
by national (wataniyya) courts in 1956, pluralism of personal status laws in independent 
Egypt was enshrined in the law 462/1956 which limited the application of non-Muslim 
family laws to parties “sharing the same rite” and “non-violation of public policy.”151 
The modern Egyptian judiciary has managed to justify the existence of discriminatory 
marriage law, while simultaneously adhering to the clauses of the constitution that allow 
for freedom of belief and ratified human rights conventions. This was made possible 
through invoking ‘al-nizam al-‘amm’, or ‘public order,’ which became the “legal 
barometer of the coexistence between Muslim and non-Muslim communities in 
Egypt.”152 The invocation of the notion ‘public order’ in the courts could be traced to the 
end of the nineteenth century when the country adopted European legal concepts, 
primarily from the French legal system.153  In several of its rulings the Court of Cassation 
defined public policy as “the social, political, economic or moral principles in a state 
related to the highest (or essential) interest (maslaha ‘ulya, or: masalih jawhariyya) of 
society,” or as “the essence (kiyan) of the nation.”154 However, these "principles” that 
make up public policy were never explicitly outlined in Egyptian legal literature, and thus 
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their definition are left to the courts to determine, on an ad hoc basis as is the case with 
European legal systems.155   
The principle of “public policy” has continuously enabled the Egyptian state, particularly 
the judicial branch, to interfere in matters pertaining to religious dogma. In contemporary 
Egyptian legal literature, it is often assumed that Islamic rules and norms make up an 
integral part of the Egyptian public policy. Nevertheless, “this central role of Islamic law 
is never mentioned when scholars define public policy, but only when they interpret 
it.”156 For instance, the Court of Cassation has previously ruled that: “Islamic law is 
considered an [inalienable] right of the Muslims (fi haqq al-muslimin), and is therefore 
part of public policy, due to its strong link to the legal and social foundations which are 
deep-rooted in the conscience of society.”157 Thus, I argue that the notion of public policy 
was hijacked for some dubious understanding of religious morality or what constitutes 
the essence of society. 
The Egyptian judiciary has oftentimes adopted a conservative approach towards legal 
issues that pertains to Islamic law, in particular, towards rules viewed by the majority of 
the Egyptian public and Muslim jurists as “indisputable rules” (nass sarih qati' al-thubut 
wa qati' al-dalala).158 Remarkably, many of these “indisputable rules” discriminate 
against women and violate freedom of belief for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. For 
instance, examples of these indisputable rules include the unilateral right of the husband 
to divorce his wife (talaq), the right of polygymy, apostasy, the prohibition for a Muslim 
woman to marry a non-Muslim husband.159 This shows how a secular concept such as 
public policy was utilized by the Egyptian state to favor majoritarian “Islamic” norms, 
deemed constitutive of national identity. 
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D. Legal Pluralism’s impact on Coptic identity and the Coptic community  
Anthony O'Mahony, Emma Loosley, argue that current marriage laws in Egypt help keep 
the social separation between Muslim and Copts intact.160 They also note how both the 
Muslim and Coptic community have used social pressure in order to discourage interfaith 
marriages.161 They further argue that the Coptic community make up a distinct group 
within Egyptian society given how Coptic identity is closely associated with Egyptian 
nationalism.162 In Egypt, Coptic identity “with its strong family cohesion, and with its 
customs, beliefs and values” is deeply rooted in the tradition and history of the Coptic 
Orthodox Church.163  Building on this observation, one could note how maintaining a 
separate personal status law for Copts under the full supervision of the Church became 
seen as essential for preserving a distinct Coptic identity. Moreover, resistance to 
progressive reforms aimed at the personal status law does not come from the religious 
intelligentsia alone. The contemporary Coptic community in Egypt continue to exhibit 
traditional views towards crucial issues such as personal status law and the limits of 
personal autonomy. It is therefore not surprising that defending the Coptic family laws as 
they stand today in Egypt is regarded by many Coptic-Christians as synonymous to 
defending the religious tradition itself.  Under the post-colonial state, the interference of 
Coptic Church into the domain of personal status “has invested Coptic religious identity 
in family law to a degree that is historically unprecedented.” 164 
 
Today, Coptic family law in Egypt has become “the sole domain of communal legal 
autonomy.”165 It is only natural that Coptic Christians feel that, if it was not for the 
Church’s control over family law, they would have been forced to completely assimilate 
to Islamic norms that already dominate Egyptian public ethos. As previously argued, 
there is already an asymmetrical legal hierarchy since sharia-based Muslim personal 
status law regulates marriages between Christians belonging to different sects and even 
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inheritance and custody issues involving all Christians. Accordingly, Coptic family laws 
on marriage and divorce have come to represent the essence and core of religious 
identity. This view is shared by Coptic clerics and laity alike.  
During the Ottoman era – like Muslim women who engaged in forum-shopping of the 
different Shari’a courts – Copts and Jews had the option resort to Shar’ia courts to 
bypass the more restrictive laws of the Church.166 This was no longer possible after the 
codification of personal status unless one of the Coptic spouses changed their 
denomination or their religion all together. In fact, today, the Coptic Church has become 
far more aggressive in policing Copts. In the same way that Muslim intelligentsia fights 
viciously any attempt to undermine their control over personal status laws, the last 
bastion of a dismantled Islamic legal system, the Coptic Church does the same thing. But 
in the Coptic case, the struggle is more intense, given that both the Coptic Church and 
members from the Coptic laity view any attempt to introduce reforms to family law as an 
incursion on the Coptic minority's constitutional right to religious freedom. It is seen as a 
violation of their collective rights in a domain where they had preserved jurisdiction for 
decades. This resistance to reform symbolizes more than just intransigence and 
patriarchy; this resistance “says a lot more about the modern secular state’s 
transformation of concepts such as “the family,” religious identity, and intra-communal 
relations as earlier patterns of religious hierarchy and gender difference are 
exacerbated.”167 For centuries, the Muslim and Coptic communities in Egypt have 
created their own perceptions of artificial frontiers separating between both of their 
communities.168 Both religious communities have “stuck to their ideas of frontiers 
because of the social significance that they attributed to the frontier as an instrument of 
delimitation and self-definition.”169  
Today, religious-based family laws have effectively became one of the main tools used 
by the modern Egyptian state to keep the frontiers between both religious communities 
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intact. Consequently, the unit of the “family” became a scared site that is heavily guarded 
by laws and social norms in order to maintain the existing power relations. To that end, 
calls to legalize all forms of interfaith marriage threaten to break these imagined frontiers 
maintained legally by the state, and socially, between these two religious groups. 
Mahmoud Mamdani notes that “the identities of colonized societies are not simply ­ 
consensual (traditional), they are also enforced from above, through law. At the same 
time, law is not external to consensus; it participates in shaping it.”170  Having a 
pluralistic personal status law in a post-colonial state like Egypt enforces and strengthens 
already existing religious identities from above while simultaneously deriving its 
legitimacy from the consensus that it helped create and maintain.  
E. The Fallacy of the Public/Private Distinction 
Modern-day Egypt provides formal guarantees on equal citizenship in the secularized 
areas of law and the constitution, while simultaneously institutionalizing religious 
difference in personal status laws.  Ironically, forcing someone to marry someone of the 
same religion they are born into or forcing interfaith and intersect couples to marry 
according to Islamic law is often disguised as an expression of “religious liberty” and 
articulation of “minority rights” by the Egyptian state. The irony lies in the fact that this 
move to institutionalize religious difference has contributed to many other forms of 
discrimination.  
In theory, a modern secular state is supposed to guarantee to its citizens that their 
relationship to the state is not contingent upon their religious identity. Still, Egyptian 
citizens are not able to marry, divorce, or even convert faiths without having their civil 
status directly affected by their “personal” or “private” choices. Many feminist scholars 
have denounced the traditional distinction between the private and the public sphere.171 
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What is normally understood to be private (sexuality and family) is actually implied by 
public society and its politics and vice-versa.  One prominent challenge to the distinction 
is that presented by radical feminist scholar Catharine MacKinnon who argues that “for 
women the measure of the intimacy has been the measure of the oppression. This is why 
feminism has had to explode the private. This is why feminism has seen the personal as 
the political. The private is public for those for whom the personal is political.”172 
 Since the early 1980s when MacKinnon was writing and until today, the public/private 
distinction provoked much controversy within feminist discourses. There is a wealth of 
feminist scholarship written on this false dichotomy. It is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to go into debating how each strand of feminism understands and theorizes this 
distinction. However, it is possible to identify some common ground between those 
feminist positions which, despite being critical of the public/private dichotomy, still think 
of it as a useful framework.173 In this context, public/private is often considered as an 
analytical concept, rejecting the “mechanistic separation of the two spheres.”174 In many 
ways these feminist critiques can be used to understand how maintaining a religious-
based personal status code has been used as one of the tools to oppress women and Copts 
both in the “public” and political sphere.  
Until today the Egyptian Identity cards lists the religion of its holder and this form of 
discrimination is often justified by stating that this is necessary in order to be able to 
determine the legal premise of personal matters such as inheritances and marriages. The 
problem is that the use of national identification cards is not limited to personal or 
“private” matters only; identity cards must be presented in order to be able to access any 
type of government service as well as to obtain employment, education, banking services, 
and conduct many other important private transactions and even to vote. Consequently, 
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having a religious based personal status is used as a justification for forcing one’s 
religious identity to be constantly present and on display while engaging in everyday life 
economic, social, civil, and even political matters which allows for many incidents of 
discrimination take place. It appears that the private/public distinction is in fact an 
artificial fragile concept as ultimately matters pertaining to the “private” will always have 
an influence over matters pertaining to the “public”. 
Conservative estimates of the Coptic Christian minority in Egypt approximate that Copts 
make up around ten percent of the Egyptian population.175 I argue that its status as a 
minority have pushed it to become even more resilient when it comes to maintaining the 
Church’s monopoly over the personal status laws. The post-colonial state project pushes 
for a homogenous state founded on the principle of citizenship instead of having an 
openly heterogeneous society. However, what ended up happening in the modern 
Egyptian state is that both Muslims and Copts were forced to homogenize under the 
different personal status laws in the name of dominant reasonableness. This is the case 
mainly because there is no “inner democratic form” within the Muslim or Coptic 
community that can influence or reform their respective religious personal status laws in 
any way. In many ways the post-colonial authoritarian regimes of Egypt have 
successfully managed to manipulate fears and uncertainties surrounding the majority-
minority relation in a way that serves their own interests.  
In what follows, I explore how maintaining religious-based personal status laws has 
enabled authoritarian regimes in Egypt to mold liberal conceptions of citizenship in a 
way that is reminiscent of the hierarchical millet system. I examine how this process 
helped different authoritarian regimes to govern sectarian identities in a way that 
provoked sectarian violence. 
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V. Modern Secular Governance and the Management of Sectarian Relations 
A. Modern Liberal Conceptions of Citizenship  
 
Citizenship is the basis of civic and political life in the modern nation-state.  Legally, 
citizenship can be defined as “a status that denotes membership of a nation-state and 
which carries with it certain rights and duties associated with that membership.”176 In 
classical liberal theory, citizenship is thought of as “a form of social membership used as 
a basis for claim-making with which comes access to rights, privileges, and freedoms 
allocated and protected by state institutions.”177 However, Shourideh Molavi notes that 
“an account of ethnicity, culture, gender and sexuality, class and religion” has been 
absent for the most part from the classical models of liberal citizenship.178  
 
Classical liberal theory imagines a state that is impartial to and disinterested in different 
ethnic or religious groups living inside its borders.  It often frames citizenship as “a 
passive and active membership of individuals in a nation-state with accompanying 
universalistic rights and responsibilities at a formally defined level of equality.”179 Yet, 
despite theoretical proclamations that liberal citizenship grants universalistic rights and 
does not legally privilege certain individuals or communities, realistically this is almost 
never the case. There is not a single example of a modern-state that completely grants its 
citizens direct access to its privileges and protection, in a manner that is entirely 
consistent with the liberal idealistic understanding of citizenship.180  This is not 
necessarily because no state has ever applied liberal citizenship properly, but it’s because 
the liberal conceptualization of citizenship is in itself lacking. The main problem is that 
liberalism divorces citizenship “from its social and historical context, and therefore fails 
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to take into account the way in which structural inequality restricts access to the resources 
necessary to the practice of citizenship.”181 
 
There are many well-rounded critiques aimed towards debunking liberal conceptions of 
citizenship. For instance, there is the republican critique, which conceptualizes 
citizenship “not as the means to an end, but as an end in itself.”182  The republican 
tradition does not believe that individuals should be divorced from their community. It 
believes that the true path to the good life “is through communal political life” and not 
through the individualism that deeply imbedded within the liberal tradition.183 There is 
also the classic conservative critique which is most famously articulated in Edmund 
Burke’s book Reflections on the Revolution in France. The conservative critique is based 
on the assumption that “citizenship and community cannot be artificially constructed but 
must develop naturally.”184 Burke argues that rights can only have real substance and 
significance when they stem from historical processes owning to tradition. He further 
argues that rights will always be “contingent upon a complex set of social and political 
arrangements which cannot be wilfully or rationally constructed as liberals would 
maintain.”185  
 
A third renowned critique of liberal citizenship is the Marxist critique, most notably in 
Karl Marx's own 1843 essay, “On the Jewish Question”. In this essay, Marx argues that 
religion is the product of a deep sense of alienation which would not disappear even if the 
state is secularized. He traces the original foundation of this alienation to the liberal 
separation between the state and civil society.186  Finally, there is also the feminist 
critique that articulated by feminists such as Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacy187, Carole 
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Pateman188 and Diana H. Coole.189 This critique mainly criticizes the “underlying 
gendered assumptions of classical liberals' treatment of categories like the state, the 
citizen and the social contract.”190  
 
Keith Faulks puts forth the argument that “liberalism is an agency-based approach 
because it stresses the importance of individual action and freedom of choice as 
explanations of social change.”191 The liberal assumption that the individual can be 
understood outside of the collective political community, disregard for the most part the 
restraints that social structures, such as class, gender, and religion place on individuals.192 
Thus, not only does liberal conception of citizenship fail to adequately address structural 
inequalities, it also places the blame on the individuals for their weakness and failure to 
utilize their citizenship in a liberal society.193 
 
 To better understand the situation of the Coptic minority in Egypt, I retract the main 
steps of the path from the dhimmah status to citizenship. In this next section, I situate 
liberal conceptualization of citizenship in the case of Egypt. I argue that although calls 
towards liberal citizenship in Egypt might theoretically result in a better situation for 
Copts than their status-quo, one must still be aware of its pitfalls and limits.  
 
B. Liberal Conception of Citizenship: the Case of Egypt 
 
Modern Egyptian personal status laws were derived from a larger sociopolitical order of 
the Ottoman period, known as the millet system. Under the auspices of this millet system, 
non-Muslim religious communities (dhimmis) were accorded juridical autonomy over 
aspects of their internal affairs. Interestingly, as Mahmood notes this “‘nonliberal model 
of pluralism’ did not aim to politically transform difference into sameness; instead, 
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various contiguous religious groups were integrated through a vertical system of 
hierarchy in which Muslims occupied the highest position.”194 Over the course of the 19th 
century, many aspects of this millet system were slowly transformed with the 
introduction of modern nation-states and new concepts such as civil and political 
equality. 
 
There was a shift in language that came with the introduction of the post-colonial modern 
Egyptian state. Novel terms such as equal citizenship and national unity were introduced, 
which implied the “inclusion” rather than “exclusion” of different religious identities. 
Under the modern Egyptian state, Copts are no longer called “dhimmis” and the millet 
system that was previously employed by the Ottoman Empire has been 
abolished. Theoretically speaking, non-Muslims are no longer “excluded” from the realm 
of politics and are granted equal treatment and opportunity under the law.  However, as 
Rachel Scott notes, “an important feature of the Islamist discourse on citizenship in an 
Islamic state is the emphasis upon citizenship existing alongside the religious social 
structure of Egyptian society.”195 Given both the Muslim and Coptic communities’ 
resistance to any attempts aimed at secularizing the current personal status laws, one 
could argue that the vast majority of Egyptian masses envision a model of citizenship that 
preserves and institutionalizes religious difference in the realm of the “intimate”. 
Nonetheless, one of the inevitable consequences of such model of citizenship is that 
political conflict over religious difference often end up unfolding over the terrain of 
familial and sexual relationships.196  
 
 The modern Egyptian legal framework ultimately retains the same historical separation 
between Muslims and non-Muslims that existed under the millet system only this time it 
is confined almost exclusively in the realm of the “family” and the “household”.197  
Egypt’s authoritarian rulers ultimately have interests in maintaining the plurality of 
personal status laws as it is; this plurality preserves religious differences which keeps 
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citizens divided. The management and oftentimes the manipulation of religious 
difference has developed as one of the cornerstones of authoritarian rule. Post-colonial 
modern Egyptian regimes were able to reproduce and maintain a similar hierarchy of 
religious difference to the one that existed under Ottoman rule. Only this time they are 
able to do so while disguising it behind the new-found language of “equal liberal 
citizenship” and “religious freedom”.  
 
Famous slogans and chants calling for of al-waḥdah al-waṭaniyyah (national unity) were 
hijacked and exploited across Egypt’s modern history to deny the very existence of a 
sectarian question, while maintaining that recurrent sectarian clashes are only the 
invention of the “enemies of the country”. An example for such slogans is El deen lel 
allah wa al watan lel agmee (Religion is for God, and the homeland is for all) which was 
Saad Zaghloul’s famous slogan during 1919 revolution to unify all Egyptian to fight the 
British colonial rule. Another example is Yahya al helal maa el saleb (Long live the cross 
and the crescent). These slogans along with others such as Muslim wa Meshei eed wahda 
(Muslim, Christian, One Hand) promptly appear all over state media channels whenever a 
sectarian incident takes place. These phrases in many ways have been used as propaganda 
to sweep real sectarian issues under the rug rather than addressing the root causes of the 
problem.  For instance, Paola Pizzo notes how “the myth of al-waḥdah al-waṭaniyyah 
(national unity) became the most fashionable political slogan”198 during the 1980s while 
in the backdrop there was an increasing process of Islamization occurring in Egyptian 
society.  
C. Egyptian Authoritarian Regimes and the Management of Religious 
Difference 
The modernization of the Egyptian legal framework was one of the processes that 
ultimately enabled authoritarian regimes to shape, reinforce, and manipulate existing 
sectarian identities and patriarchal structures in a way that serves their best interest. For 
decades, the Middle East region has been plagued with authoritarian rulers who, in order 
to preserve their rule, have often resorted to survival strategies. The most notorious of all 
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is the “divide and conquer strategy”, or as Mahmood Mamadani calls it the “define and 
rule strategy.”199  The “define and rule strategy” manipulates social and sectarian 
cleavages and pits citizens against one another. This strategy was first introduced by 
former colonial powers200 and was later picked on by Arab authoritarian 
regimes.201Authoritarian regimes, accordingly, tend to be more prone to sectarianism.202 
Egypt’s growing number of sectarian incidents over the past decades, only confirms that 
the state’s function has shifted from one that supports social cohesion to one that 
threatens it.  
There is a considerable body of academic literature that primarily deals with the topic of 
Muslim-Copts relations and sectarian violence in Egypt especially given the growing 
numbers of sectarian incidents in the past few decades. The following section will outline 
how Egyptian authoritarian rulers starting with Gamal Abdel-Nasser and ending with 
Hosni Mubarak have chosen to deal with issues of religious difference and sectarian 
identities and how ultimately one is the main outcomes of their chosen strategies was 
sectarian violence.  
1) Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s Era 
During the 19th century, members of the Coptic laity became more influential in Church 
matters and Church-State relations. It was the year 1874, that saw the establishment of al-
Majlis al-Milli, which can be described as “a parallel institution to the Coptic Orthodox 
Church with a mandate to oversee Coptic endowments (awqaf), manage Coptic schools 
and institutions, and run Copts’ personal status courts.”203 Al-Majlis al-Milli, was 
exceptionally progressive for its time especially when it came to issues pertaining the 
Coptic family matters. As mentioned, it was al-Majlis al-Milli, which adopted the 1938 
ordinance that expanded the scope of permissible divorce for Copts in Egypt 
 
199 MAHMOOD MAMDANI, DEFINE AND RULE: NATIVE AS POLITICAL IDENTITY, 44 (Harvard 
University Press, 2012), (2012). 
200 Id. 
201 Nader Hashemi, Toward a Political Theory of Sectarianism in the Middle East: The Salience of 
Authoritarianism over Theology, 1 JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC AND MUSLIM STUDIEs, 69&70, 65-76 
(2016). 
202 Id.  
203 MARIZ TADROS, COPTS AT THE CROSSROADS: THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING 
INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT, 62 (The American University in Cairo Press, 2013), (2013).  
 51 
 
exponentially. Nonetheless, the authority of this progressive consultative body came to an 
abrupt end during the 1950s under Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s rule. The Nasser regime 
adopted certain policies that attempted to “curb the powers of al-Majlis al-Milli and by 
default that lead to the expansion of the power of the Church leadership.”204 As a result, 
under Nasser’s leadership came “the weakening of the Coptic laity which was 
accompanied by the strengthening of the political and social role of the Church.”205 
A pact was formed during the 1950s between Pope Kyrollos VI and the State’s political 
leadership.206 This pact entailed that the Church politically align itself with the regime in 
exchange for unlimited political support given by the pope on behalf of the Coptic 
community.207 Tadros highlights the role that the personal relationship between President 
Gamal Abd el-Nasser and Pope Kyrollos VI played in resolving many sectarian issues at 
that time.208 Moreover, Nasser’s regime was known for its tokenism which further 
reduced levels of Coptic political participation in the government while strengthening the 
Pope’s role in political matters.209 It was under Nasser’s political and economic policies 
that Egypt witnessed its “first wave of increased Coptic emigration to the West.”210 
Moreover, it was under the leadership of Nasser that confessionalism found its way into 
Egyptian society after the loss of the six-day war in 1967, as many Egyptians, Muslim 
and Christian alike, turned to mosques and churches after their disappointments in 
politics.211  
There are no records of major sectarian violence incidents that erupted under Nasser’s 
rule like the ones witnessed under Anwar al-Sadat’s and Hosni Mubarak’s regime. 
Nevertheless, I argue that many of the policies of Abdel-Nasser’s regime can be seen as 
setting the stage for the sectarian violence that followed.  Although it was ostensibly a 
secularist regime, Nasser’s policies still had many enduring negative consequences on the 
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Coptic community. It was under his regime that the Coptic community was forced to 
become more homogenous under the hierarchical leadership of the Coptic Church, as the 
Church assumed its role as the sole representative of the community. Moreover, it was 
President Abdel-Nasser who curbed the powers of Majlis al-Milli, which meant that 
under his rule there was no longer a parallel Coptic institution pushing for reforming the 
Coptic Church. Under Abdel-Nasser’s regime, religious affiliation became the main 
marker of Coptic engagement in the public life rather than citizenship.  As the Coptic 
Church assumed its role as the middleman between the Copts and the state under 
Nasser’s rule, Copts could no longer voice their desires, anxieties, and demands directly 
to the state through conventional civic engagement channels like civil society 
organizations and political parties.212 
2) Anwar El-Sadat’s Era 
The death of Nasser in 1970, followed closely by Kyrollos’ death in 1971, brought two 
new actors onto the national scene: President Anwar al-Sadat and Pope Shenouda III. 
Brownlee goes on to describe how in the 1970s, Anwar al-Sadat started to embrace the 
Islamists as a counterbalance to the socialists.213 Inevitably, this lead to the deterioration 
of regime-church relations under his rule.  Under Sadat’s rule, article 2 which stipulated 
that “principles of Islamic law (Shari’a) are the principal source of legislation”214 was 
first introduced in the Egyptian constitution of 1971 as neither the Egyptian constitution 
of 1923 nor that of 1953 made any such references. The pope unsurprisingly opposed the 
introduction of this article and resisted what he saw as a creeping Islamization of the 
Egyptian state and society.215 Sadat then accused Pope Shenouda of separatism, saying 
“the Coptic pope wanted to carve off a piece of Upper Egypt to form a Christian state.”216 
Against this backdrop, Egypt started witnessing its first major incidents of sectarian 
violence in decades.  
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Under Sadat’s rule, the renovation and construction of churches was the main trigger for 
many incidents of sectarian violence217 and it is an issue that successive Egyptian regimes 
have failed to address until today. The first major incident of sectarian violence under 
Sadat’s rule took place in November 1972, after a mob of Muslim citizens attacked the 
local Bible Society in the Delta village of Khanka located in the governorate of 
Qalyubiya. Coptic Christians in the village were using the Bible Society facilities as their 
local place of prayer, because there was no church in their vicinity which angered some 
of the Muslims living in the village.218 Since the 1972 incident, more incidents of 
religious discrimination and violence followed and tensions reached its peak between 
President Sadat and Pope Shenouda between 1980 and 1981. In June 1981, the infamous 
incident of El Zawya el Hamra took place as violence between the two parties broke out 
over church construction.  It left 17 people dead and 112 injured.219 Brownlee argues that 
this was the only the projected result given that Sadat’s policies nurtured an environment 
of interfaith mistrust and did not intervene to stop the violence when it began. It only got 
worse as his political repression intensified; Sadat locked many prominent Egyptian 
figures and placed Shenouda under house arrest.  
 Tadros explains that these attacks were the inevitable result of a series of factors that 
contributed to the heightening of political tensions between Sadat and the pope, including 
“the rise of Islamist groups, increased sectarian incidents, and the growing role of Coptic 
immigrants as a lobby group in the United States against Sadat’s policies.”220 She adds to 
these factors Sadat’s growing representation of himself as “the believer president” and his 
support for the Islamization of society. Moreover, the 1980 constitutional amendments, 
particularly those introduced to article 2, further complicated the situation, as the pope 
himself openly and personally opposed the amendment.221  
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3) Hosni Mubarak’s Era  
Both Nasser’s and Sadat’s policies paved the way for the sectarian violence that took 
place under President Hosni Mubarak. With religion replacing nationalism, “matters that 
should have been governed by law became flash points for identity politics.”222 In 1981, 
Mubarak took over and maintained Sadat’s general domestic policies while easing some 
of repression.223 Regime-church relations had a fresh start and the pope was released 
from house arrest in 1985.224 Mubarak and Shenouda started a similar pact to that was 
under Abdel-Nasser; the pope would support Mubarak politically in exchange of the 
president giving the Church autonomy over matters pertaining to the Copts.225 As Jason 
Brownlee notes, this pact, which can be described as a form of “religious corporatism,” 
expanded the powers and authority of Pope Shenouda and simultaneously enabled 
Mubarak to address the entirety of the Coptic Community via a single proxy.226  This 
served to increase confessionalism as Copts who had political objections were compelled 
to voice their complaints via the Church and not as nationals of the state. Pope Shenouda 
stood as ruthless supporter of Mubarak even when lay Copts were against it.227 This pact 
just served to sweep problems under the rug rather than fixing them and thus sectarian 
violence continued. 
To make matters worse, Mubarak took advantage of the rising wave of attacks against 
Copts to his own political benefit.  Mubarak instead of utilizing the law in the service of 
both Christians and Muslims equally, “he positioned his regime as the only firewall 
against sectarianism. For decades he and his coterie propagated the narrative that without 
Mubarak’s protection the Copts would fall into the shadow of a zealously Islamist and 
anti-Christian regime.”228 Tadros notes the radical change of Pope Shenouda’s tone and 
discourse in respect of Mubarak’s government after his release from house arrest in 
1985.229 This radical change was most apparent when Pope Shenouda endorsed the 
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government’s position with regards to article 2 of the 1971 constitution, the very same 
article he openly and fiercely opposed thirty years earlier during Sadat’s era.230 Tadros 
adds to Brownlee’s analysis of Shenouda and Mubarak’s pact as she explains that some 
of the elements of the tactical agreement that existed in the Kyrollos–Nasser pact were 
restored.231 This pact also included greater collaboration between the State Security 
Investigations Service (SSI) and the Church.232 One of the merits of this new pact was a 
presidential decree which delegated to governors the responsibility for approving 
applications for the construction or renovation of churches233 though in practice this 
remained problematic.  
However, what was new under Mubarak is that the Coptic Orthodox Church had to 
negotiate the terms of the pact on several levels: the president, the political policy-making 
arena, and the state security apparatus. This further complicated things as it made it 
harder for the church to reach an agreement.234 She argues that in addition to the pope’s 
policy of open support for the Mubarak regime, he also adopted a non-confrontation 
policy toward sectarian incidents.235 Interestingly, though some writers might attribute 
this change of attitude to the government’s crackdown on Islamists, Tadros suggests that 
Pope Shenouda’s rapprochement with the government came earlier than this crackdown 
which in turn refutes the theory of a causal relation between growing Islamist militancy 
and Shenouda’s change of tone.236 Tadros also addresses the criticism of various Coptic 
groups to the increasingly political role of the Church and its impact on citizenship. She 
also talks about the Church’s failure to tone down voices of protest among Coptic 
emigrants, during Sadat’s and Mubarak’s era, as they remained an entity that acted 
independently of the Church.237  
Mubarak’s regime resorted to informal avenues to deal with the problem of sectarian 
violence rather than punishing the perpetrators in accordance with the law. It became 
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almost an established pattern, under his rule, that “the judiciary did not hear cases 
involving sectarian violence.”238 A report published by Egyptian Initiative for Personal 
Rights (EIPR)  on sectarian incidents taking place in Egypt between January 2008 and 
January 2010 noted that the security apparatus (SSI) often tried to stop sectarian incidents 
from getting to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for investigation.239 The SSI also bargained 
with the parties to the conflict and pressured them to pursue reconciliation at the police 
station.240 This inevitably nurtured an “ongoing climate of impunity” because the 
government was unwilling to prosecute or get involve with incidents of sectarian 
violence.241 Mubarak’s policies that dealt with incidents of sectarian strife was marked by 
a greater involvement of the State Security Investigations Service (SSI), abuse of the 
emergency law, and the use of customary reconciliation sessions.  
All three of these practices were questionable and failed to stop sectarian strife as the 
numbers of sectarian incidents continued to rise under Mubarak. For instance, Hossam 
Bahgat, former director of EIPR noted that "between January 2008 and January 2010, we 
[EIPR] documented 52 violent attacks on Christians or sectarian violence incidents in 17 
out of 29 governorates”242. "[T]hat's very disturbing because it really is a rate of two 
violent episodes a month in a majority of governorates,” he said.243 In an open violation 
of the law, the security apparatus under Mubarak’s regime often held ‘customary’ 
reconciliation sessions in which victims of sectarian violence were often denied their 
rights and the suspects involved in those cases escaped punishment. In some cases, these 
so-called reconciliations even led to the forcible eviction of victims from their homes, as 
has been documented by Human Rights Watch.244 Joshua Stacher notes that “this 
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extrajudicial model encouraged vigilantism and violence, because perpetrators were not 
sent to prison when they destroyed property or committed murder in the course of 
interreligious clashes.”245 
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VI. Interfaith Relationships and Sectarian Violence 
A. Religious-based Personal Status Codes: One of the triggers for the eruption 
of Sectarian Violence? 
There are five different scenarios that usually trigger sectarian violence in Egypt: the 
building and construction of churches, conversion, expressing controversial or 
“offensive” opinions on religion, interfaith romantic and sexual relationships, personal 
feuds between Muslims and Christians. In the first scenario, the law regarding the 
construction and restoration of churches in Egypt, up to the most recent one passed on 
September 28, 2016 by the House of Representatives, imposes great restrictions on the 
building of churches. The law is characterized with ambiguous language with the same 
dominant discriminatory logic, because it gives the executive authority and the security 
apparatus wide discretion to determine the right to build and repair churches. As for the 
second scenario, limitations are placed on religious conversion, although in theory there 
is no legal ban on Muslims converts to Christianity or other religions. In June 2009, a 
ruling by the Cairo Administrative Court stated that freedom to convert does not extend 
to Muslim citizens.246 For the third scenario on expressing opinions of faith, article 98 of 
Egypt’s Penal Code in 1981, criminalizing contempt of religion, has been used to limit 
various forms of religious expression and only sanction the ones approved by the ruling 
elite.  
For the purposes of this thesis, I am particularly concerned with sectarian violence fueled 
by interfaith romantic and sexual relationships. The scope of this thesis is limited to 
exploring the personal status laws, and its historical connection and present impact on 
sectarian identities and cleavages. Saba Mahmood notes that “a cursory glance at the last 
ten years of Muslim–Coptic conflict reveals, a vast number of sectarian incidents are set 
off by rumors about an interfaith romance, a woman’s abduction, and marriage.”247 
Egyptian Activist Elham Eidarous notes that some studies place interfaith relationships as 
the 2nd or 3rd reason for sectarian strife in Egypt.248 Moreover, a study on sectarian 
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incidents that took place in Egypt from (2008-2012), found that the “escalation of small 
disputes/fights” was the first trigger behind the eruption of 20.89% of sectarian incidents 
recorded by this study (61 out of 292 sectarian incidents were triggered by this reason).249 
“Muslim/Christian gender relations and disappearance of women and girls” was found to 
be the second/third most common trigger for the eruption of sectarian assaults as it was 
the trigger behind 15.75% of all sectarian incidents recorded by the study (46 out of 292 
sectarian incidents were triggered by this reason). Interestingly, sectarian incidents 
triggered by building/expansion of churches also made up around 15.75% of all incidents 
recorded.250  
 
In what follows, I explore incidents of sectarian violence that were triggered by interfaith 
romantic and sexual relationships and/or religious conversion insomuch as it pertains to 
interreligious marriages. I use a number of high profile cases that were hotly debated in 
Egyptian media as well as low profile cases that were only mentioned in police reports 
and did not make it to national news outlets.  
 
B. Incidents of Sectarian Violence Triggered by Interfaith Romantic and Sexual 
Relationships 
The infamous cases of Camillia Zakhir (summer of 2010) and Wafaa Qustuntin (2003) 
share an almost identical story despite the fact that there was approximately a seven-year 
gap between them.251 Both women were married to Coptic priests and both of them 
suddenly disappeared from their home without leaving prior notice. In both of these 
cases, violent episodes of sectarian violence were triggered by rumors of the involvement 
of both of these two women with Muslim men.252 Both of their husbands accused the 
members of the Muslim community of kidnapping them and forcing them to convert and 
to marry a Muslim man. Following these accusations, members of the Coptic community 
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took the streets demanding the state’s intervention and demanding that the state return 
both of them back to the church and to their families.253  
In both cases, the notorious SSI eventually managed to uncover the locations of both 
women and accordingly they were “arrested” and handed over to the church 
authorities.254 In the case of Waffa Qustuntin, the Coptic patriarch then, Shenouda III, 
even used his personal relationship with then president Hosni Mubarak to pursue this 
demand and Mubarak complied by giving out presidential orders to find her.255 Upon 
Mubarak’s presidential orders, the state security police arrested Qustuntin and handed her 
over to the church authorities.256 The church authority promptly announced she had not 
converted to Islam and was holding firm to her faith. Qustuntin has not been seen or 
heard from since and reportedly she lives in the seclusion of the pope’s monastery in 
Wadi al-Natroun.257  As for the case of Camillia Zakhir (2010), the church authorities 
handled the situation in a similar manner as they promptly announced she had not 
converted to Islam, but that she left her home because of marital problems.258 She was 
then held under the custody of the Coptic Church until her appearance on television 
almost a year later. After her televised appearance, a public campaign that was sponsored 
by different Muslim groups accused the church of kidnapping Zakhir in complicity with 
the state, and commanded that she be “restored” to the Muslim community.259 At the time 
of the incident, “mosques packed for prayers at the end of Ramadan became rally sites 
where banners were lifted for ‘freeing sister Camillia’ and taking disciplinary action 
against Pope Shenouda.”260  A number of attacks were subsequently launched on Coptic 
churches in connection with the incident.  Some members belonging to the Coptic 
community even linked the deadly and unprecedented bomb attack on a prominent 
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church in Alexandria (which took place on January 1, 2011) to the protests surrounding 
the Zakhir controversy”261. 
 The above-mentioned cases were high profile cases that most Egyptians were aware of 
as they were discussed on leading media outlets and TV shows. Further, other incidents 
of sectarian violence, albeit of equal gravity, did not receive similar media attention. One 
of those cases took place in the province of Giza where a middle-class worker tortured a 
Christian man, after he caught him with his daughter at his house. The worker then 
invited his nephew and together they tortured the Christian man, as they burnt him with 
cigarettes and a heated knife, and then placed him on impalement until he lost 
consciousness.262 The girl’s father did not try to hide his crime, on the contrary, he 
carried the man’s unconscious body and threw it in front of the Christian man’s family 
house.263 For the father this was an honor crime. The incident was then reported to the 
police which quickly intervened and formed a blockade surrounding the area.264 The 
prosecution then questioned the girl who said that they were simply in love and wanted to 
get married and was thinking of conversion to be able to do so.265 This incident could 
have turned into a wide spread sectarian violence if it was not for the fact that it took 
place just four days before 2011 Alexandria bombing of the Saints Church and got lost 
with all the fuss surrounding the bombing.266A very similar case recorded by police 
report number 4702 administrative Hadyaa El-Quba267 but it was the Muslim girl that 
was reported by the neighbors to be visiting her Christian lover’s house. Consequently, 
the house was put under surveillance and the police raided the house when it was sure 
that the girl was in it.268 The police then proceeded with investigation just to discover that 
they were married with a orfi contract and that the girl was pregnant and she later gave 
birth to a boy.269 
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All law is inherently violent, as Jacques Derrida famously argues "there is no such thing 
as law (droit) that does not imply in itself, in the analytic structure of its concept, the 
possibility of being 'enforced', applied by force."270 The enforcement of law presupposes 
a state monopoly on violence. The family exists by virtue of laws that police exactly what 
and who institutes a family. The state’s enforcement of the ban on certain forms of 
interfaith marriages and restriction of divorce for the Coptic minority, is a symbolic act of 
violence. When people try to defy the laws that interfere with their own personal choices, 
the emblematic violence inherent within those laws becomes translated into tangible 
violence the public space.  
 
What the above-mentioned cases reveal is that state restrictions on interfaith marriage and 
conversions in Egypt, though they to blame, are just the tip of the iceberg; underneath the 
water lies a much more complex sociopolitical situation. Foucault argues in “the Subject 
and Power” that as the modern nation-state has advanced out of Christian institutions, it 
inherited the “pastoral power” that these institutions originally possessed. That this 
pastoral power of the state (which is an extension of disciplinary power, and an 
alternative perspective to sovereign power discussed above), is not a force that lingers 
above the people living in the society it rules, rather, it is deeply entrenched in the social 
nexus of this society.271 So from a Foucauldian lens, the Egyptian masses have 
internalized the idea perpetuated by the state that interfaith relationships are a taboo 
topic; just the thought of amending the personal status law would be seen as a direct 
insult to their belief system. They started to take the violence sanctioned by law into their 
own hands, so that when a couple decide to go against the laws that govern marriage and 
family, one of the reactions to that is sectarian violence. It’s like a never-ending cycle; 
law which is inherently violent makes the society, and the society in turn makes the law 
that is inherently violent.  
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C. A Feminist Analysis of Incidents of Sectarian Violence  
This construction of nation as feminine is representative of the symbolic weight given to 
women as procreators of a nation’s culture and tradition,272 in this sense women’s bodies 
come to represent broader claims about culture, identity, and territoriality.273 “The very 
language of nationalism singled women out as the symbolic repository of group 
identity.”274 Ancient myths, such as Helen of Troy in the Ilyad and Sita in Ramayan, 
about violent nationalistic struggles that started with women being abducted, and armies 
(of men) mobilizing to go for their “rescue” have existed since ancient times.275 
Ironically, Helen of Troy was never really abducted to begin, perhaps like Qustuntin and 
Zakhir. Rather, she eloped with Prince Paris of Troy whom she has fallen in love with 
despite being married to King Menelaus of Sparta. As many feminists have previously 
observed, women are often the objects of such narratives but they are rarely their subjects 
or agents276 as men are always portrayed as the abductors and women as the abductees 
that need men to save them.  This gendered narrative has not changed as women’s bodies 
continue to appear prominently in almost all nationalist and communitarian struggles 
(whether ethnic, racial, or religious) in the modern period.277 Thus, the incidents of 
sectarian violence outlined above “are yet another example of the anxiety that haunts 
relations of power across lines of sexual and gender differences.”278 
Recent incidents of sectarian violence that involve a love relationship between a Christian 
man and a Muslim spark outrage for the Muslim majority. Conversely, if it involved a 
Muslim being in a relationship with a Christian woman, it is considered an anathema for 
the Coptic minority. What’s significant about all the above-mentioned cases is that they 
all involve a “woman” converting to Islam. Egyptian Christian men convert as well to 
Islam and sometimes they choose to convert back to Christianity but no one bats an eye. 
 
272 Elif Gözdaşoğlu Küçükalioğlu, Imagination of Gendered Nationalism: The Representation of Women as 
Gendered National Subjects in Ottoman-Turkish Novels (1908-1938), 2 (2005) (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Bilkent). http://www.thesis.bilkent.edu.tr/0003083.pdf 
273 Mahmood, Sectarian Conflict and Family Law in Contemporary Egypt, Supra note 18, at 56.  
274 NATIONALISM: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1495, (John Hutchinson et al. 
eds., Psychology Press, 2000). (2000).  
275 Mahmood, Sectarian Conflict and Family Law in Contemporary Egypt, Supra note 18, at 56. 
276 LATA MANI, CONTENTIOUS TRADITIONS, 117 (University of California Press, 1998), (1998). 
277 Mahmood, Sectarian Conflict and Family Law in Contemporary Egypt, Supra note 18, at 56. 
278 Id. 
 64 
 
Never has a Salafi demonstration went out calling for their “brother” to be brought back 
and never has the Egyptian state intervened to force a Christian man to  return back to the 
Church.  
Essentially, women are the ones who reproduce the boundaries of ethnic, racial, or 
religious groups, and they are the “privileged” signifiers of religious difference and their 
bodies are the symbolic repository of group identity. In these incidents of sectarian 
violence, women's bodies came to signify the sanctity of their religious community. 
Through these kinds of sectarian conflicts, women's bodies became arenas for violent 
religious strife. This violent regulation of female sexuality and women’s bodies is also 
largely manifested in the practice of honor killings in Arab societies.  
Honor killings is well documented practice in Arab countries, and some Arab countries 
even have in their penal codes articles that grants mitigation to male family members who 
kill their female relative for engaging in, or being suspected of engaging in, sexual 
practices before or outside of marriage.279 Lama Abu Odeh notes how “reports of the 
crime reveal that poor women killed by their male relatives are more frequently the 
victims of honor killings.”280 She further argues that “nationalist honor is upheld by 
dividing women into sexual rebels (the well-off) on the one hand, and possible victims of 
killing (the poor) on the other, and in a parallel fashion, dividing men into possible killers 
(the poor) on the one hand, and disciplinarian, beneficiaries-of-the-killing-of-the-poor 
(the well-off) on the other.”281 It should be noted that sectarian violence triggered by 
rumors of interfaith relationships is also divided along class lines, as it often confined in 
poor working-class neighborhoods and underprivileged provinces and villages.  
In Egypt, a female’s honor is not only associated with her male family members’ honor 
but it also linked to her entire religious group’s honor especially if her lover adheres to a 
different religion than her own. Today, both Muslim and Christian women are still seen 
as the bearers of the honor of their entire religious communities. This is why the act of 
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women leaving her religious group, whether it is by choice or by force, is usually framed 
shameful to her entire religious community.  
The gendered narrative in the above cases, is built around the idea that women, especially 
Coptic women, are vulnerable subjects void of agency that can be easily manipulated by 
predatory practices of men belonging to the other religious community.  When a woman 
chooses to leave her religion, it is no longer an expression of her own religious liberty 
because she is the bearer of her community’s religious freedom. Egypt’s asymmetrical 
recognition of one-way religious conversion further complicates the story; Egyptians can 
only convert to Islam, but not to any other religion. Even though both the constitution of 
1971 & 2014 ostensibly gave all citizens freedom to practice their religion, this right was 
once again limited by the concept of “public order”. In 1980 the High Administrative 
Court ruled that “it is completely acceptable for non-Muslims to embrace Islam but by 
consensus Muslims are not allowed to embrace another religion or to become of no 
religion at all.”282 Logically, the Coptic community has anxieties over their eventual 
dissolution from the Egyptian state given the large numbers of Coptic emigration to the 
West283 and the asymmetrical Egyptian rules on religious conversion. It might appear to 
be counterproductive for the Coptic Church to maintain its intransigent stances on 
divorce as Copts who are stuck in an unhappy martial situation have no other choice but 
to convert to Islam or change their sect.284 For the Church, “the issue of divorce 
symbolizes the growing encroachment of Islamic law upon its teachings and upon the 
Christian way of life.”285 
Both the Muslim and Coptic communities are interested in maintaining religious-based 
personal status laws as they are. For most of the Muslim community, the hierarchy that 
places Islamic personal status law over all other religious personal status laws is an 
articulation of their majoritarian hegemony and an admittance of the Islamic character of 
the Egyptian state, both of which they intend to keep. One the other hand, the Coptic 
minority is interested in maintaining its autonomy over the only body of law that the 
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Church still maintains its control over. From the perspective of the church, civil marriage 
would diminish the church’s control over the community, and that, it is feared, would 
lead to the dissolution of Coptic identity. Civil marriage also provides easier paths to 
conversion, which would further decrease the numbers of Coptic Christians in Egypt.286 
The same fear surrounds interfaith marriages, which, while rare, are usually accompanied 
with religious conversion and are thus considered a loss.287 Thus there are vested 
interests: for Christians, keeping the religious identity of the marriage helps preserve the 
balance between the Coptic and the Muslim communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
286 Id. at 171. 
287 Id. 
 67 
 
VII. Conclusion: 
Marriage is often romanticized in the popular imagination as the union of two people as 
partners in a romantic and personal relationship. However, the realties and state 
restrictions imposed on the marriage institution today distorts this simplistic 
understanding of marriage. Marriage in many ways can act as an influential hegemonic 
tool that helps the state with defining and dividing the society on the bases of identity, be 
it gender, class, or religion.  In Egypt, marriage is a legal right granted only to couples 
that will reproduce “normal,” “healthy,” “hetrosexual” and “homogeneous” off springs 
who would turn into ideal citizens in the future. By sanctioning certain types of marriages 
and prohibiting others, the state attempts to ensure the stability of the society and 
homogeneousness the religious communities living within its borders. Through its 
maintenance of pluralistic religious-based personal status laws, the Egyptian state gets to 
attain the best of both worlds: it got to ensure the hegemony of the Muslim majority 
while simultaneously appeasing the Coptic minority.  
The main difference between the current Muslim and Coptic personal status laws is that 
the former represents majoritarian national identity, while the latter is framed as an 
exception. On the other hand, the main similarities between the two bodies of law is that 
they both conceptualize the concept of the family in a similar way while discriminating 
against women from their respective communities in their own distinct ways.  
Both women and Coptic Christians are situated between overlapping structures of 
subordination. The Egyptian state governs sects in the same way it governs sex. Women 
and Coptic Christians are not just subordinate in the Egyptian legal framework; they are 
similarly subordinate. Both groups are viewed as subordinate from the point of view of 
family laws. Islamic Shar’ia is seen as the overarching system that governs all of family 
law matters, while the Coptic family law is framed as its subsidiary exception. Thus, the 
idea that being Muslim is the gold standard while being Christian is the exemption is 
reinforced. Similarly, women are treated by family laws as subordinates to the men of 
their respective religious communities. Egyptian family laws have actively served in 
reinforcing patriarchal gender dynamics and perpetuating ideas about women's 
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subordinate place within the family. In that sense, men become are framed as the superior 
subject of family law and women as the inferior.  
Moreover, Coptic Christians are punished by violence in the same way women are 
punished by it. Christians will be punished for actions that Muslims get to do without any 
repercussions, such as for their efforts to proselytize, praying in vicinities not licensed as 
churches, and renovating churches without permits. In the same token, Egyptian women 
are subjected to violence for their sexual conduct or for expressing their sexuality; acts 
that their male counterpart often get away without suffering any consequences. It’s 
important to remember the intersections of patriarchy, sectarianism, and classism when 
talking about a complex issue such as sectarian violence triggered by interfaith 
relationships between Egyptian men and women. As has been mentioned in this thesis, 
underprivileged Coptic women belong to three overlapping structures of subordination. 
Thus, the consequences they suffer for their expressing their personal autonomy does not 
take place in a vacuum and cannot be separable from their overlapping identities as 
Copts, women, and individuals coming from an underprivileged class.  
The conservative attitudes the Coptic minority have shown towards marriage, divorce, 
and freedom of religion show that while the Copts oppose having Islamic law as the 
overarching law, they still want an understanding of citizenship that preserves the 
centrality of the church. They fear that the Coptic community will eventually disappear. 
The Christian family is the center of the Coptic community, as such, personal status laws 
need to remain as they are. However, the paradox lies in the fact that this emphasis on 
personal status law reinforces the Church’s emergence as a political and social 
representative of the Copts, which seems incongruent to liberal conceptions of 
citizenship.  
The language used by the Coptic community to call for their rights as equal citizens has 
endorsed religion as the marker of their group identity while simultaneously emboldening 
the modern ‘secular’ state as the de facto arbiter and definer of religious difference. It’s 
within the state’s best interest to define, regulate, and reshape religion in the image of the 
majority. The state will utilize secular concepts such as “public order” to allow the 
religion of the majority to become the ‘neutral’ standard by which minority groups and 
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religions are judged against. This was one of the factors that enabled the Muslim-
Christian relation in Egypt to take on its particular form that we witness today, a 
relationship that is marked by discrimination against the Coptic community and episodes 
of sectarian violence.  
The historical development of both the Muslim and Coptic personal status laws and the 
introduction of modern legal technologies have both helped shape the current Egyptian 
legal framework. Religious-based personal status laws, a leftover from the Ottoman 
millet system, underwent various transformations under the modern nation-state. The 
legal pluralism of the Egyptian legislative system in many ways highlights the paradoxes 
and tensions created by modernity. On one end of the spectrum, there is the notion of 
equal citizenship which attempts to eradicate religious difference and on the other end 
there the religious based personal status laws which exacerbates religious difference by 
dividing citizens into separate legal communities. I argue that in order to form a complete 
picture around the problem of sectarianism in Egypt, one needs not to ignore the 
structural tensions created by the postcolonial state and the model of religion–state 
accommodation adopted by the Egyptian state.  
The publically recognizable personality of the Egyptian state is heavily mediated by its 
Islamic character. Initially, it appears that the simple answer to solve the problem of state 
restrictions on interfaith romantic and sexual relationships is to extend the secularization 
process to the personal status laws. However, the application of Shari’a has always had a 
secular tool that complemented it. There had been no point in modern Egyptian legal 
history when Shari’a had been strictly adhered to. In fact, the modernization process of 
the Egyptian legislative system was one of the historical processes that led to the laws 
being the way they are currently. The model of secularism that was implemented in 
Egypt did not guarantee religious tolerance, rather it has consistently placed the Coptic 
minority in a defensive position. 
 Religious-based family laws have also been entrenched in society to the extent that they 
have been internalized by both the Muslim and the Coptic communities, and came to 
define the very identity of both communities. In that sense, law has been successful – it 
has divided society. As Talal Asad notes “the law never seeks to eliminate violence since 
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its object is always to regulate violence.”288  Law has been internalized by the collective 
consciousness as truly a manifestation of society’s own desires. As a result of this, the 
symbolic violence inherent within the laws came to be materialized in the form of 
episodes of sectarian violence whenever someone attempted to go against those laws or 
norms. Only this time this violence was not necessarily perpetuated by the state but rather 
by the people themselves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
288 ASAD, Supra note 18, at 8. 
